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Abstract 
 
This study focuses on explaining the absence of violent conflict, a symptom 
associated with the „resource curse‟, in resource extraction projects in volatile and 
resource dependent regions. An institutionalist approach is adopted in proposing that 
the agency of the resource extraction corporation is crucial in suppressing resource 
curse symptoms. This is illustrated in the case study of BP‟s Tangguh LNG Project in 
the separatist region of Papua, Indonesia. BP‟s undertaking of organisational learning, 
the evolution of institutions that influence company policies, and the governance role 
that BP has assumed in the region, are nominated as factors preventing the 
appearance of the resource curse in this case. The study concludes that by taking a 
greater institutional role in the region, BP has been instrumental in suppressing the 
resource curse, but that the threat of violent conflict will always linger in such 
precarious zones.  
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Figure 1- Map of Indonesia 
 
 
From BP Berau Ltd LARAP 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Image of Tangguh LNG Project, West Papua, Indonesia 
 
 
From BP Berau Ltd Environmental Monitoring Report 2007. 
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Acronyms and Glossary 
 
Adat – customary  
ADB – Asian Development Bank  
AMDAL – Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan, Environmental impact 
assessment 
Birds Head Region – The geographical region comprising the western head of the 
island of New Guinea 
BP - Formerly known as „British Petroleum‟. Used to refer also to BP Indonesia and 
BP Berau Ltd.  
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LARAP – Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan 
LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas 
NGO – Non-Government Organisation 
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Otsus – Otonomi Khusus, Special Autonomy 
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RAV - Resettlement Affected Village 
RI – Republic of Indonesia 
SatuNama – Indonesian NGO 
SBY – Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
SEIA – Summary Environmental Impact Assessment 
TIAP – Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel 
TNI – Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian armed forces 
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Table 1- Timeline of Recent Events 
 
Year Tangguh 
Stage of 
Production 
Tangguh Project 
Developments 
Indonesian and Papuan 
Politics 
Resource  Extraction 
Developments 
1996 Exploration 
begins (ARCO) 
Seismic activity. Suharto‟s regime destabilised by 
dissenters supporting Megawati.  
BP Colombia and Freeport human 
rights allegations surface. Court case 
against Freeport in USA. Riots near 
Freeport; OPM kidnaps foreigners 
1997 Exploration 
(ARCO) 
Seismic activity - 
unresolved accusations 
arise in relation to its 
harmful effects. 
Asian Financial Crisis. Tribal war near Freeport as a result 
of migration. 
1998 Exploration 
(ARCO) 
Seismic activity. 
Preliminary studies and 
consultations begin. 
Suharto resigns. Habibie assumes 
presidency. 
 
1999 Exploration 
(ARCO) 
Release of land for LNG 
plant.  
Initial resettlement 
agreements. 
Papuan demands from „Team 100‟ 
presented in Jakarta. East Timor 
declares Independence. Wahid 
elected president. GOI passes 
human rights laws.  
Freeport announces Human Rights 
Policy and training for staff. UN 
Global Compact launched. 
2000 Exploration 
(BP) ARCO 
acquired. 
  „Papuan Spring‟- push for self-
determination.  
VPSHR founded. 2 court cases 
against Freeport in USA.  
2001 Exploration 
(BP) 
Site selection finalised. 
Resettlement Program 
begins. 
Megawati assumes presidency. 
Special Autonomy laws enacted. 
Killing of Papuan leader Theys 
Eluay. Violence in Wasior district 
of Papua. 
 
2002 Exploration 
(BP) 
Approval of AMDAL.  
First TIAP report.  
Bali Bombings. Kidnappings and killings at 
Freeport. 
2003 Exploration 
(BP) 
 Papua divided into two provinces 
(pemekaran);  
First EITI plenary. 
2004 Construction Villagers of Tanah Merah 
resettled. 
SBY elected president. Tsunami 
ravages Aceh. 
 
2005 Construction NGO concerns raised in 
open letter to BP. 
Peace agreement between Free 
Aceh Movement and RI. 
 
2006 Construction   Court case against BP Colombia in 
UK. 
2007 Construction  Lombok Treaty signed between 
Australia and RI. Presidential 
Instruction: „New Deal‟ for Papua. 
 
2008 Construction Demobilisation of 
construction workforce. 
  
2009 Operation Final TIAP report.  Killing of OPM leader Kelly 
Kwalik. Re-election of SBY. 
Shootings at Freeport mines. Court 
case against BP Colombia in UK. 
Court case against Freeport in 
Indonesia. RI applies for EITI 
candidature. 
2010 Operation  TIAP 2 to release first 
report. DAV programs to 
amalgamate with ISP. 
Special Autonomy laws 
symbolically „returned‟ to Jakarta 
by Papuan leaders.  
Court case against Freeport in 
Indonesia. Gulf of Mexico oil spill; 
BP sells assets inc. Colombia 
pipeline. 
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Introduction 
 
Resource conflict literature holds that in an underdeveloped region, where the state is 
weak and rebel chapters are present, violent conflict is a likely outcome of resource 
exploitation. However, in the case of BP‟s Tangguh LNG Project in Papua,1 Indonesia, 
this has not been apparent, in spite of the case possessing characteristics synonymous 
with the criteria of the „resource curse‟. The first question which will direct this study 
asks, what factors have contributed to the ostensible absence of violent conflict in the 
vicinity of the Tangguh Project, in spite of resource conflict predications indicating that 
its occurrence is inevitable in such a politically fractious and underdeveloped region? As 
a resource extraction organisation, has BP undergone a process of learning and 
evolutionary change that has contributed to this absence of violence? Finally, what are 
the theoretical and policy implications for resource conflict literature, specifically the 
resource curse hypothesis, if other factors including institutional change are seen to 
undermine its explanatory power?  
 
Resource conflict literature has been useful in explaining the economic effects of 
resource extraction in underdeveloped nations, and to this end has been highly influential 
in global political studies, even informing World Bank policy (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). 
                                                     
1
 Note on Names: The western half of the island of New Guinea has had several politically loaded monikers. The 
Dutch knew the region as West New Guinea and gave it the name West Papua when it intended for the region to be 
independent (Leith 2003). Since Suharto banned the usage of Papua during his tenure, Indonesians have known the 
region as Irian Jaya and Irian Barat. President Wahid officially changed its name once more to Papua in 2001 (King 
2004). After the division in half of Papua under President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the two provinces there within are 
the regencies of Papua and West Papua (Papua Barat). In this study, the region as a whole will be referred to as Papua 
and references to the provinces will be made explicit in order to retain conceptual clarity and ease of understanding. 
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This study will contend, however, that an institutional approach to analysing the political 
sources of resource conflict can provide a more complete explanation than traditional 
resource conflict literature in accounting for the occurrence of violence, or lack thereof. It 
allows for a multiplicity of dynamic actors, including the operator of the resource 
extraction project, which are governed by evolving institutions and organisational 
learning. This position also acknowledges the governance role that a company plays in 
the context of a politically volatile and underdeveloped region. 
 
In understanding this apparently atypical case of the Tangguh Project, it is first necessary 
to develop a theoretical framework. It will then be used to explain the relevancy of 
resource conflict literature to this case study, and the reasons it cannot account for 
Tangguh‟s tentative success. This will be covered in Chapter 1, followed by an 
alternative analysis based on an institutional approach. The rest of the chapter will 
provide a background to the Papua region and the Tangguh LNG Project, and then 
outline the study‟s design and methodology. The next two chapters analyse the two 
institutional concepts of learning and evolution respectively, in the context of this case 
study. The study‟s comparative component Chapter 2: Learning; compares examples of 
different types of learning through the examples of BP‟s operations in Colombia and 
Freeport McMoRan‟s mine in Papua. In Chapter 3: Evolution, the study will focus on 
how BP‟s corporate policies have evolved, showing the company‟s modifications in 
terms of both strategies and aspirations. Chapter 4 then discusses the effects of 
institutional metamorphosis on the outcomes of BP‟s enlarged societal responsibilities, 
while Chapter 5 will conclude by providing answers to the research questions.  
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Chapter 1: Theory, Case and Study Design 
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
1.1.1The Resource Curse 
The importance of the process of resource exploitation as a determinant of a state‟s 
economic welfare, mode of governance and its potential for conflict has been 
increasingly understood in recent political science literature. The concept of the „resource 
curse‟ (Auty 1994) has been used regularly in political economy parlance to describe the 
perceived tendency of those states with an economic dependence on resources to 
experience negative economic and political consequences as a result of their exploitation, 
including its impact on growth rates, regime type, development and conflict.  
 
Resource conflict theorists see underdeveloped states as more vulnerable to rent-seeking, 
as the government vies for the surplus profits and/ or landlord rents
2
 produced by 
resource exploitation. In turn, these revenues cultivate a climate of corruption, 
unproductive investments, and betting on future revenues through loans, leading to high 
levels of debt. This is conducive to the emergence of a kleptocracy, as governments rely 
on rents as a primary source of revenue while the tax raising bureaucracy lies idle, with 
little need to establish procedures or enforce tax collections from the citizenry (Dunning 
2008).This in turn leads to a loss of accountability and transparency as funds are more 
easily skimmed for personal gain and there is less capacity for the people to track 
revenues as they do not come from their own pockets (Weinthal & Jones Luong 2006). 
                                                     
2
 Both types of revenues are referred to as „resource rents‟, see Dunning 2008. 
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As the disparity between the rich and powerful and those outside clientelistic networks 
increases, so too does the frustration of the marginalised, who will be more likely to 
resort to violence to express their grievances (Le Billon 2001). Giordano, Giordano & 
Wolf (2005) find that conflict occurs in resource-rich regions where resource sovereignty 
is ill-defined, institutional resource regimes collapse, or where changes in resource 
environments outpace institutional capacity to adapt to these changes.  
 
There are a wide range of variables to account for the appearance of the resource curse, 
but its symptoms of violence, fiscal mismanagement, predatory states and aggrieved 
groups are commonly identified. Examples used in this literature of explanatory variables 
includes the prevalence of both resource abundance and resource scarcity as leading to 
conflict, as well as finding correlations between different types of natural resources and 
their ability to incite conflict (Dunning 2008, Ross 2005). These often conflicting 
correlations imply that it is less the quantity or type of resource that a state produces that 
determines the level of conflict, but resource dependence. Some theorists have looked to 
the ownership of resources, whether public or private, the „strength‟ of the state, the 
financial management of revenues accrued, and the devolution of the agricultural sector 
as other explanatory factors (Weinthal & Jones Luong 2006, Schollaert & Van der Gaer 
2009, Humphreys 2005). Resource conflict literature is in agreement in that there is a 
cause- effect relationship between resource extraction and weak states, but there has been 
less agreement in the explication of this relationship.  
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1.1.2 Limitations of Resource Conflict Literature 
A limitation found within resource conflict literature, which is demonstrable in this case 
study, is that the majority of works focus on African resource conflicts, with passing 
mention of conflicts in other continents (Humphreys 2005, Kapelus 2002, Collier & 
Hoeffler 2005, Fearon 2005). This is problematic as the analyses contain generalisations 
based on assumptions drawn from African experiences, which have a unique political 
context that is not always transposable to other locations. For example, resource curse 
literature uses the politically loaded term „rebels‟(Collier and Hoeffler 2005), and carries 
the assumption that the state is so weak that rebels pose a threat to state sovereignty, as 
has been seen in certain African conflicts. Within other states, however, rebel groups may 
not be viewed so much as a threat to sovereignty by the state, but rather a criminal ring or 
militant protestors. Furthermore, it has been argued that these profiteering groups, the 
„rebels‟ or „belligerents‟ (Le Billon 2001), may use transportable resources as a means of 
financing their groups‟ activities. This would imply that less transportable or „lootable‟ 
fixed point resources, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), would be less prone to 
conflict. However, this explanation is hardly satisfactory in accounting for an absence of 
violence, as conflict can originate from resource extraction for reasons other than the 
physical acquisition of resources for the financing of oppositional groups. Many reasons 
for conflict can exist that may not be related to the pursuit of the resource itself, but 
instead stem from the effect of resource extraction on the lives of the local community. 
  
Another limitation of this literature is in its neglect to acknowledge the multiplicity of 
actors who are involved in the process of resource exploitation. It is not only 
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governments and rebels involved, but communities, non-government organisations 
(NGOs), security forces, and of course the company that is operating the extraction 
project and its accompanying army of contractors and consultants. With this in mind, the 
sources of potential conflict also compound. It is not only merely „greedy rebels‟ or 
„grievances‟ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005) from populations who have missed out on 
resource spoils that provide a catalyst for conflict, but a host of other issues emanating 
from different sources. Environmental damage, loss of lifestyle, absence of expected 
benefits, jealousies between groups, failed attempts at development, in-migration and the 
perception of culture loss can all be factors contributing to conflict. 
 
 These sources of conflict have been recognised by corporate social responsibility and 
resource management studies (Kapelus 2002, Hilson 2002, Clark & Cook Clark 1999, 
Reed 2002) as well as political anthropology (Kirsch 2001, Abrash & Kennedy 2002, 
Kirksey 2009), but these aspects have yet to gain traction in political resource conflict 
literature. These works recognise the importance of a multi-faceted community based 
approach to developing and understanding the effects of resource extraction and the need 
to reduce externalities that may lead to conflict including the neglect of indigenous rights, 
environmental risks and poor communication. Such social factors not only provide a 
more complete picture of potential problems fuelling resource conflicts, but also show 
that the concept of resource conflict cannot be explained only as a contest for control 
over resources between the government and rebels.  
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1.1.3 Proposed Framework: Institutionalism 
The robustness of the theory is further queried in cases where there is little evidence of 
violent conflict as a result of resource extraction in spite of indicators that would suggest 
otherwise, particularly those of poverty, rebel presence and weak governance 
mechanisms. Resource conflict explanations are insufficient in fully comprehending the 
absence of major conflict, including in the case of BP‟s Tangguh Project in Papua, 
Indonesia. While some studies have researched the effects of governmental and financial 
institutions on resource conflict (Weinthal & Jones Luong 2006, Giordano, Giordano & 
Wolf 2005, Mehlum, Moene,& Torvik 2006), the most obvious organisation involved in 
resource extraction is not analysed-  the operating company. The variable that resource 
conflict literature ignores that may help to explain this situation is the independent 
agency and power of the corporate institution involved in extraction and its primary role 
in generating political outcomes.  
 
A corporation, as with any other organisation, is governed by rules, conventions and 
restrictions that determine its behaviour. As noted by Douglass North, „institutions are the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction‟ 
(North 1991, p.97). Institutionalism assumes that formal and informal rules constrain 
behaviour to create a stable framework for interaction, whereby uncertainties and costs of 
exchange are reduced (North 1990). Thus an organisation‟s decision making mechanisms 
are driven by endogenously and exogenously formed rules, by its learning from 
experiences and observations as well as the evolution of its changing preferences and 
understandings. This dynamic approach to institutionalism is linked closely with the 
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notion that organisations can affect change incrementally through experiential and 
observed learning. In turn, this new knowledge will through evolution affect the 
institutional framework constraining organisational behaviour and influence political 
outcomes (Thelen & Steinmo1992).  
 
Institutions bind and guide participating organisations and individuals, and are 
characteristically static and inflexible in order to be consistent and effective. They are the 
„protective response‟ used by society to „sustain the social fabric [and] to reduce 
uncertainty‟ (O‟Hara 2007, p.20). Yet institutions are embedded within a globalised 
world that is in a constant state of flux, that is to say that „change is ongoing and, 
therefore, principles are always in the process of revision and reassessment in light of 
new evidence and developments‟ (O‟Hara 2007, p.35). Institutional change is 
incremental, alternately stymied and promoted depending on changeable factors such as 
vested interests, societal norms and member resolutions. The resource industry typifies 
global changes in institutions governing business behaviour, as businesses interact with 
institutions in order to increase business responsibility for human rights, security, 
development and the environment. Institutional changes within the last decade can thus 
be seen to be a powerful mechanism for controlling business behaviour, for voicing 
societal expectations and for addressing global needs.  
 
It is under this institutional influence that extractive companies set the parameters of the 
project and its direction through their approach to the community engagement, security 
arrangements and the environment. If conflict is to be avoided, an extractive company‟s 
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relationships with communities and governments, as well as other actors including 
security forces and NGOs are pivotal. It is the metamorphosis of the company in its 
relationship with other institutions that determines the outcomes of resource exploitation 
for the local community. Ultimately, in the absence of an engaged state, the onus is on 
the extracting company to direct the social effects of exploitation, as it has the ability to 
acquire the financial, personnel and technical means to reduce negative effects. The 
responsibility thus falls on the company‟s shoulders, as it is the primary organisation 
affecting change in the region. Whether or not the company regards this responsibility as 
being within its functions, it has increasingly been seen that without recognition of the 
gravity of this role, conflict, and the negative impact it will inevitably have on the 
company, is the most likely outcome. 
  
1.2 The Case Study 
1.2.1 Papua 
The history of Papua is also that of its resources, as resources are the reason that the 
region has been colonised, occupied and plundered for over a century. The region‟s 
recent history has been summarised in Table 1, alongside developments in the resources 
sector. The island of New Guinea, of which Papua comprises the western half, was 
originally populated by Melanesian ethnic groups, unlike the rest of the Republic of 
Indonesia whose lineage is primarily Malay. Tribes were dispersed and weakly 
connected, causing ethnic divisions that are still salient today. Dutch colonisation from 
1828 did not have a significant impact in the more remote areas of Papua, some groups 
did not even encounter foreigners until the 1960s (Elmslie 2002), as the Dutch used the 
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region as a trading outpost and ruled through local leaders. One of the most influential 
elements of Dutch colonisation was the Christian missionaries whose influence made 
Christianity become the leading religion in Papua to this day, in contrast to the 
predominately Muslim population of the rest of Indonesia. 
 
The Dutch were grooming West Papua for self rule during the 1950s as decolonisation 
followed in the wake of World War II (WWII) (Elmslie 2002). An independent West 
Papua would still have commercial links to Holland, and would allow the Dutch „to 
extract itself from centuries of empire with some semblance of dignity‟ (Elmslie 2002, 
p.11). Inversely, the Indonesians were determined to secure Papua, as it was considered a 
logical and symbolic step of decolonisation that all of the disparate territories that were 
acquired by the Dutch would now be recognised as part of the Indonesian republic.  
 
International support waned for the Dutch and the New York Agreement was struck in 
1962 when Papua was to be officially handed over to Indonesia in 1963. The transfer of 
sovereignty was to be confirmed in 1969 with the controversial referendum 
commissioned by the UN, known ironically as the Act of Free Choice (Elmslie 2002). 
West Papuans were to vote on becoming part of Indonesia; however the Indonesian 
government selected a handful of „representatives‟ to vote for the entire population. The 
representatives were subject to military coercion and unanimously voted in Indonesia‟s 
favour. In spite of this coercion, the UN still recognised the vote as valid (King 2004). It 
was in this moment that the relationship between Papuans and Indonesians was 
irreparably damaged. However, it was also in Indonesia‟s decolonisation and subsequent 
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internal colonisation of Papua that Papuans ceased being an object of a struggle and 
became direct participants, developing a heightened sense of national consciousness 
(Chauvel 2005).  
 
Under Suharto, Papua was used as the national supplier of revenues and resources, 
however the benefits of Suharto‟s push for development did not reach Papuans. 
Resources and foreign direct investment kept the regime afloat and was an integral part of 
Suharto‟s system of patrimonialism. Additionally, many resource projects involving 
timber, fishing and oil palm plantations were instigated by small Indonesian companies, 
many of them illegal and run by members of the military to supplement their income 
(King 2004). The effect of these projects has been the denial of Papuan control of their 
land, economy and rights, as well as encouraging a ceaseless flow of in-migrants who 
have transformed Papua‟s demographic composition. The resource curse explains many 
of the political and economic consequences that affected the region. By the 1980s the 
symptoms of the curse were apparent as enormous revenues from Freeport McMoRan‟s 
Papuan mines flowed to Suharto‟s government, funding the corruption, cronyism and 
nepotism that characterised his regime (Leith 2003). This will be discussed further in 
chapter 2.  
 
In response to this history of injustices, resistance groups have been established, 
including the OPM (Free Papua Movement, Organisasi Papua Merdeka). The OPM is 
one of the most well-known rebel groups in Papua with both political and militant wings. 
They have been operational in the Freeport concession area, but do not use natural 
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resources as a means of financing their activities and their direct control of the resources 
is non-existent (Braithwaite 2010). At the same time, as a result of the oppositional 
presence of groups like the OPM and of the proliferation of resource extraction projects, 
the state has been provided with a pretext for reinforcing its territorial control through 
increased military and police deployment to the Papuan provinces (Elmslie 2002). This 
has severely impeded the ability for these oppositional groups to gain territorial traction 
in the region. 
 
In the post-Suharto period, hopes for mediation were revived as the spirit of 
democratisation saw Papuan groups initiate non-violent methods to advocate for 
independence. Under the presidencies of Habibie and Wahid (Gus Dur) the Special 
Autonomy laws (Otsus) were developed and enacted in 2001. These laws were to 
symbolise a fresh start in relations by providing economic and political benefits to the 
Papuan people - but not independence. Under the presidency of Megawati the laws were 
only 10% implemented by 2003 and West Papua was divided into two administrative 
regions, Papua and West Papua (Sullivan 2003). This was conceived by many as a means 
of creating geographic and fiscal divisions among Papuans, preventing a united Papua 
(Sullivan 2003). Pemekaran, the division of Papua into smaller administrative units, 
continues as villages clamber to obtain Special Autonomy funds for the betterment of 
their immediate community, as against a broader Papuan identity.  
 
Since the rise of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), West Papua has remained 
a taboo subject and little progress has been made to mediate the differences between the 
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Jakarta, Indonesia‟s Javanese capital, and the Papuan provinces. While the central 
government has interpreted Special Autonomy as meaning economic autonomy, it is 
political autonomy that Papuans demand (ICG 2010). In spite of the government‟s 
development spending, the effects are yet to be felt by the general population. 37% of the 
population in Papua is living in poverty,
3
 which is more than 10% higher than other 
impoverished provinces including Aceh and Maluku (BPS 2009). Papuan protestors, with 
the backing of the recently formed Papuan People‟s Council (MRP- Majelis Rakyat 
Papua), have recently declared Otsus to be a failure and symbolically rejected it, handing 
it back to the central government in July 2010, with even those who first saw the policy 
as a possible compromise or first step towards self-determination now perturbed by the 
problems of implementation (ICG 2010). 
 
Indonesia considers Papua an annoyance, a domestic issue that can be solved through 
economic development (ICG 2010). Papua is simultaneously regarded as the outlier 
province, underdeveloped and backward; and as Indonesia‟s rightful resource-rich 
inheritance from the process of decolonisation, integral to its nationalist conception of 
„Unity in Diversity‟ in retaining sovereignty over an ethnically diverse archipelago. 
Papuans remain divided on how best to react to this continued neglect and express their 
burgeoning sense of nationalism, opinions on solutions varying from secession, to 
international dialogue, to a simple revision of Special Autonomy.  
 
                                                     
3
 Some Papuans prefer the term „not yet fortunate‟ to „poor‟, showing their „frustrations and 
aspirations‟ for development (UNDP 2005a, p.7). 
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1.2.2 The Tangguh LNG Project 
In this context of resource exploitation BP first entered the area in 2000. In the shadow of 
Suharto, facing an uncertain political future, the effects of government neglect were 
evident in the coastal Bintuni Bay region of West Papua province that BP was exploring 
in order to establish Tangguh. The population was malnourished, surviving on a 
subsistence economy, and facing a high childhood mortality rate and low life expectancy 
(BP Berau 2005). The villagers in the Project‟s area are from the Sumuri tribe, consisting 
of 18 clans dispersed among several villages (BP Berau 2006b). The region, while remote 
and having few routes connecting the area to other parts of the province, did not have a 
completely homogenous society, however, as the area had experienced small amounts of 
in-migration over several decades. Local identities are thus multivalent and dynamic. In-
migration was caused mainly through Indonesian companies in the 1980s, who were 
interested in the area‟s multitude of resources including timber, fishing, mining, 
mangrove pulp and even clearing land for palm oil plantations. These projects have been 
on a smaller scale to that of Tangguh, but provided little benefit to local villages. In 
essence, the low level of development in this region was symptomatic of the Indonesian 
Government‟s approach to development in Papua for the majority of its history - the 
people‟s needs were neglected while its resources fuelled the development of the rest of 
the Indonesian state.  
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Figure 3. Map of Village Relocation – BP Bearu Ltd, LARAP, 2006. 
 
The actual location upon which the Tangguh Project was to be constructed was the 
location of the town of Tanah Merah. The villagers involuntarily resettled next to the 
neighbouring villages of Saengga and Onar in 2004, to make the towns of Tanah Merah 
Baru and Onar Baru (see Fig. 3). Tanah Merah itself had experienced population 
fluctuations throughout its history, as conflict with the Dutch caused villagers to move 
away from the town in 1912, while still others left in 1918 after an influenza epidemic 
(BP Berau 2006b). The village, like the Bintuni Bay region generally, comprised an 
almost equal share of Catholic, Muslim and Protestant populations. There have been few 
reports of religious tension within the Bay area, in spite of sporadic outbreaks of riots 
motivated by religious difference that occurred throughout the last decade in Manokwari, 
West Papua province‟s capital (ICG 2008). This is partly because while in-migration has 
brought in a larger Muslim population, there has historically been a Muslim community 
of mixed heritage in the nearby Fak-Fak region since before Dutch colonisation. 
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Exploration for natural gas in Bintuni Bay began in 1996 by ARCO Exploration, British 
Gas, and Indonesia‟s national oil company Pertamina, who discovered six gas fields 
beneath the Bay. ARCO and its project were bought by BP in 2000. Under a production 
sharing contract (PSC) with the Indonesian government, the state has granted rights for 
BP to operate in exchange for both the state and company splitting the profits of 
production, making BP a contractor of Indonesia. The construction of the Tangguh LNG 
plant began in 2004 and it began exporting LNG in July 2009, with an expected lifespan 
of forty years (BP Berau 2006b).  Its primary clients are Chinese, Korean and US energy 
companies. It has been financed and supported by a conglomerate of investors from 
around the world, primarily banks, and is expected to reap major revenues by 2016 (BP 
Berau 2005).  
 
Surrounded by thick forest, and invisible from most parts of Bintuni Bay, Tangguh is 
visible upon entering the resettlement villages. On land, two large storage tanks hold gas 
awaiting export, the result of two operational „trains‟ of production. These trains are 
capable of producing 7 million tonnes of LNG per year, with a view to expand them to 
five or six, potentially making Tangguh one of the world‟s largest gas suppliers. Within 
the plant‟s complex, facilities include an airstrip, shipping dock, staff accommodation 
and maintenance facilities. The Project also consists of two drilling platforms in Bintuni 
Bay, with two pipes just beneath the ocean surface that transport the gas through to the 
purification and liquefaction stages of processing before the LNG is stored and exported.  
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Three central issues of local and NGO concern in relation to the Tangguh Project are the 
potential destruction of local ways of life, migrant influxes, and unscrupulous 
arrangements with public security forces (DTE 2005). They have been universally 
identified as possible triggers for violent conflict and the hampering of development 
efforts by BP, its consultants, community partners and the media (TIAP 2009, Vidal 
2008). Thus, these concerns have formed the primary focus of the commitments BP made 
at the beginning of its Tangguh Project. The outcomes of these areas of concern, and the 
way in which these outcomes were reached, will be addressed in the proceeding chapters. 
 
1.3 Study Design 
The approach used to analyse the Tangguh Project will now be outlined, in light of its so 
far avoiding associations with violent conflict under the resource curse‟s ideal 
circumstances. Resource curse tenets would predict that BP‟s project would share the 
same fate, especially in light of its presence in Papuan history. The political climate in the 
post- Suharto era remains precarious, resources still fuel the region‟s economy, and the 
community‟s receipt of revenues is dependent upon the central government. 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, BP‟s Tangguh LNG project has managed to keep a low 
profile. In order to distinguish the factors that have prevented Tangguh from becoming a 
lightning rod for conflict, and to address the conceptual gaps found in resource conflict 
literature, an institutional approach will be adopted to describe the evolution of the 
extractive industry within the last decade and its relation to Tangguh, using the 
theoretical framework as described in section 1.1.3. In defining BP as a political 
organisation constrained by institutions, this study acknowledges the political role a 
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corporation plays in a society, as an autonomous and coherent actor that interacts with 
other political actors, in turn affecting political outcomes. It recognises the power which 
the corporation exerts over the environment in which it has embedded itself, especially in 
terms of fostering development. 
 
This study asserts that institutional evolution is possible and can contribute to a change in 
predicted outcomes. It argues that from observing and experiencing the consequences of 
unscrupulous extractive activities in similar environments and through an evolution of 
corporate norms, BP has taken conscious steps to change its corporate strategies to 
accommodate the project‟s political surroundings. Moreover, changes in the resource 
extraction industry‟s institutional framework has led to the phenomenon of BP‟s filling 
an institutional void within the region, playing a quasi-government role as it mediates 
between factions and distributes public goods. It is this institutional flexibility that is 
hypothesised to contribute to the minimal conflict levels currently experienced.  
 
Several factors will be provided to account for the apparent prevention of violent conflict. 
Firstly, a comparison will be made between the actions taken by BP in Colombia and 
Freeport in Papua, and those made by BP in the Tangguh Project to see any evidence of a 
process of learning. The next factor is the efficacy of both endogenously created informal 
rules and exogenously created formal rules in encouraging ethical corporate conduct. To 
measure the effectiveness of these codes, principles and agreements, it will be seen if 
they differ to those made in the comparative cases and whether BP has been compliant 
with these guidelines. It can then be examined whether this has affected the level of 
conflict and tension within the region.  
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Finally, BP‟s social strategies will be examined to determine whether they have been 
successful in avoiding conflict and managing potential risks. In its broad suite of social 
programs, BP has taken on roles typically attributed to governments, and even funds 
projects to help strengthen local and provincial governments. What needs to be explored 
is whether this pseudo-governmental role has helped avoid conflict in this region that has 
previously been devoid of effective governance. It must also be ascertained whether this 
foreign corporation has helped achieve what local governments have been unable to do, 
that is, foster development in the indigenous community, or if the company has 
overstepped its boundaries and risks causing conflict in doing so.  
 
Research in this thesis has been undertaken using various methods and resources in order 
to fulfil both theoretical and practical aims of the study. The theoretical basis and 
historical framework of the study has had a foundation in secondary sources, namely 
academic material. The establishment of context, both historical and current, has been 
reliant upon media output and NGO reports, while specific information on the Tangguh 
Project has drawn heavily from reports produced by BP and its external monitors. 
Primary sources include analysis of quantitative data and interviews conducted by the 
author.  
 
Interviewees have remained anonymous in accordance with the study‟s application to the 
University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee (Faculty of Arts Honours 
Ethics Committee). Anonymity was ensured in an attempt to gain full disclosure of data 
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by participants and to protect them from any negative ramifications on their personal or 
professional lives as a result of their comments and perceptions. Interviews were 
recorded on a digital voice recorder and were conducted via telephone, video 
conferencing and email between July and October 2010. A range of possible participants 
were invited to participate based on interest in, or involvement with, the Tangguh Project. 
The following is the list of the interviewees and the way in which they will be referred to 
throughout the study. 
- Former BP Consultant („Consultant A‟) 
- Former BP Executive („Former Exec B‟) 
- Representative of SatuNama, Indonesian NGO („SatuNama C‟) 
- BP Representative („BP Exec D‟) 
- USAID Representative,  US NGO („USAID E‟) 
 
It should be noted that a disappointing response to interview requests was encountered 
from human rights and legal activist NGOs, whose input may have proven integral to the 
study. Additionally, there has been noticeable reduction in NGO and media coverage on 
BP‟s Tangguh Project since the mid- 2000s when project construction was only 
beginning to take place. NGO output since this time has been either based on previous 
NGO research (cf. Cook 2010), or in response to BP reports (cf. DTE 2009). This means 
that the bulk of information regarding the plant derives from a handful of sources linked 
to BP and is a limitation of the study that is acknowledged at the outset. 
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Chapter 2: Learning 
 
2.1 Why Do Organisations Learn? 
Organisations are not static entities, but are dynamic and have the potential to change, as 
are its members, its institutions, and the external environment. Experiences, observations 
and innovations can provide opportunities for transformative learning and the 
development of new actions. Through experience and observation, resource extraction 
companies, including BP, have found that the costs of not finding a better way to adapt to 
social challenges can be higher than the costs of the uncertainties inherent in the trial of 
new ideas. It has been noted that „companies that are going to be able to become 
successful will be the ones that can learn fast, can assimilate this learning, and develop 
new insights… companies are going to have to become much more like universities than 
in the past‟ in that they must foster a culture of learning and innovation (Michael Porter 
quoted in Lipshitz, Popper and Friedman 2002, p. 79). Learning and innovation have now 
become the means of securing a competitive advantage, improving company performance 
and adapting to unpredictable environments.  
 
BP‟s long history has seen the appearance of the problems associated with the resource 
curse on many occasions and the Papuan provinces are also familiar with conflict 
resulting from resource exploitation. This chapter proposes that BP‟s experiences in the 
Casanare region of Colombia are likely to have generated productive learning within BP 
and influenced the creation and implementation of the company‟s social agenda in 
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Tangguh. Many of the staff within Tangguh had personally experienced the fallout from 
human rights abuse allegations at the Colombian pipelines first hand, and were then 
moved to begin planning at Tangguh, because they did „such a good job in Colombia‟, as 
Former Exec B stated in a sarcastic aside when interviewed.  
 
In Papua, while many small resource extraction companies operated in the region with 
blatant disregard for local interests, it was the unending saga of poor community 
relations, environmental destruction, and escalating conflict associated with Freeport‟s in 
the Mimika regency of Papua that made the multinational notorious. The decades-long 
conflict situation between the company, rebels, the military and the Indonesian state, and 
the toll taken on the company‟s reputation, its shareholders and the dangers it presented 
to staff, provides a contrast to the aims of BP‟s Tangguh Project. It was Freeport‟s 
actions that prepared BP to be greeted by a frosty reception from NGOs and wariness 
from locals (as noted by Former Exec B). With these two recent examples fresh in the 
minds of BP executives, the Papuan community and the international NGOs, they were 
likely to be instructive lessons of how not to extract resources in Papua. 
 
This chapter will investigate the hypothesis that the impetus for BP to take intentional 
and deliberate action to change its approach to community relations and social programs, 
as manifested in the Tangguh LNG Project, has stemmed from organisational learning. 
After explaining the importance of the concept of organisational learning, it will recount 
the lessons of BP in Colombia and Freeport in Papua, showing how they fit the definition 
of the resource curse. The companies‟ inability to learn, shown in their inaction, 
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mismanagement and, neglect, clearly exacerbated - if not incited - these effects. It will 
show how BP then constructively learned from its failures, experiments and other actors, 
before applying this knowledge to the Tangguh Project by developing innovative 
strategies. 
  
2.2 Organisational Learning 
The concept of learning is critical when analysing a change in behaviour within an 
organisation, the impact this has on a current situation and the implications for prevailing 
norms and institutions. This is a limitation found within resource conflict literature in its 
neglect to acknowledge the agency of organisations, as it instead holds static conceptions 
of institutions and a rational choice approach to decision making. Using equilibrium- 
based mainstream politico-economic tools such as game theory and econometrics implies 
that the decision-making is based solely on changes in the costs of actions, rather than the 
changes within the actors themselves. The setting is assumed to be static, actions 
assumed to be repeated in a costless environment, and beliefs are deemed „exogenous‟ 
(Schollaert & Van der Gaer 2009). What rational choice analyses do not explain is the 
ability for changes to appear in the choices available to actors, in their values, in the 
institutional parameters that govern them, and in the actors‟ own preferences. These 
changes can be explained by the process of learning.  
 
A framework of organisational learning foregrounds the agency and learning capacity of 
a firm and its ability to respond to changes in the environment, as well as its relationships 
with other companies and other actors. Organisational learning theory is defined as „a 
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dynamic process of creation, acquisition and integration of knowledge aimed at 
developing the resources and capabilities that allow the organization to achieve a better 
performance‟ (Perez Lopez, Montes Peon, & Vazquez Ordas 2006, p.217). Sources of 
learning may be varied, including experiments, partnerships with different actors, reviews 
of previous projects, transfers of new ideas and even failures (Bessant 2008). The pursuit 
of external knowledge is a form of organisational learning known as exploratory learning, 
while exploitative learning is the „refining and deepening‟ of existing knowledge (Kang, 
Morris, & Snell 2007, p.237). Both types of learning are important for a company‟s 
ability to improve performance, but in turbulent environments, the need for exploratory 
learning is higher as the environment „rapidly makes current products obsolete‟ 
(Lichtenthaler 2009, p.825). In Colombia, BP‟s strategies and processes were becoming 
obsolete, as the costs of these older processes were becoming too high. This study will 
trace the motivation for BP‟s learning, its sources, and application, by discussing its 
experiences in Colombia and comparing it with those of Freeport.  
 
Resource extraction companies often operate in socially and ecologically fragile 
environments, with unstable political contexts, which can amplify the mistakes 
companies make and thus place a greater importance on continued learning. A foundation 
of economic theory is that „before investment can be stimulated, a level of stability and 
certainty is required, whereby optimistic expectations of the business climate reproduce 
high levels of prospective yield‟ (O'Hara 2007, p.23), however this certainty is rarely 
present in the resource extraction sector‟s risky operating environments. As resources in 
Western democratic countries and stable authoritarian regimes are slowly but surely 
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depleting, new frontiers are being found in increasingly fragile regions, this shift 
considered a „major change‟ in the resource extraction industry (Reed 2002).  
       Geology has not restricted the distribution of hydrocarbons to areas governed as open 
pluralistic democracies. The cutting edge of the issue of corporate responsibility comes 
from the fact that circumstances don‟t always make it easy for companies to operate as 
they wish. 
(Former BP CEO John Browne in Frynas 2009, p. 7) 
This fact has required significant shifts in strategy to successfully acquire the resources 
with minimal costs to the company.  In order to avoid reputational, financial and asset 
damage, uncertainties in the operating regions need to be minimised; yet what remains to 
be developed is the best way in which a company can bring about this situation. 
 
Securing a stable environment has proven to be a considerable challenge for the resource 
extraction sector, with the traditional method adopted being feigned ignorance of social 
and environmental issues. Security strategies consisted of the „outright denial of the 
existence of human rights violations‟ while paying off brutal militias in exchange for 
asset protection (Ballard 2001, p. 9). Thus, human rights violations, environmental 
degradation, and the destruction of livelihoods have been tangible externalities resulting 
from unscrupulous methods. In response to these externalities the resource extraction 
industry has been under increased scrutiny by external groups, especially NGOs, and has 
been pressured to address these concerns. This pressure made clear that „corporations 
may not have moral intentions… but they do have consequences for which they should be 
accountable‟ (Fort 2007, p.30). Accountability has not always been a primary trait 
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attributed to the industry, but one that they have adopted as international media and the 
internet have helped publicise corporate missteps, while the threat of litigation and 
disruptive protests further provide incentives to reform.  
 
The industry has been on a steep learning curve, particularly within the last decade, as 
expectations are raised as to the role of multinational companies operating in 
underdeveloped states. An elementary lesson has been for these companies to recognise 
that their influence in political affairs and potential to create change is not unnoticed, and 
the consequent imperative to behave responsibly. This political role entails resource 
extraction companies taking on three key responsibilities in the prevention of conflict: 
suitable and humane security arrangements, an effective long term development program, 
and an approach to governance that recognises and encourages the local community‟s 
promotion of their own political interests. Failures and obstacles in companies‟ 
recognising and fulfilling these responsibilities provide the basis for both exploratory and 
exploitative learning, which will be outlined in the following case studies. 
 
2.3 BP in Colombia 
BP learned the importance of responsible and transparent political affiliations through its 
experience in Casanare, Colombia. The situation in Colombia bore the hallmarks of the 
resource curse: the collapse of other sectors, violent conflict and a weakened state 
presence. While the symptoms of the resource curse were present, the explanations in the 
resource curse literature do not account specifically for the role of the multinational 
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corporation in exacerbating conflict over land, rent and resources, essentially 
consolidating the Colombian „war system‟ (Richani 2005).  
 
Institutionally, BP espoused human rights rhetoric at an international level, and the 
company had social programs in place. At the turn of this century, BP became a member 
of the United Nations Global Compact, and met the Global Reporting Initiative 
guidelines, while compiling reports regularly throughout the 1990s (Heincke 2006). 
However, it seemed BP‟s closed- door dealings with various political actors, and the 
consequent dangers of hiring public security forces for company protection in a region 
where rebel elements operate, undermined the company‟s apparent values and social 
programs, painting them as tokenistic gestures.  
 
In 1993, when the oil pipeline was built, it was normal for gas and oil pipelines across 
Colombia to be sabotaged by rebels almost daily, accepted as „the price of operation in 
Colombia‟ (Knott 1993, p.33). BP‟s pipeline was bombed 98 times in the year 2000 
alone, with the threat of sabotage providing a means of extorting the company (Ross 
2003). It was also considered normal for companies to pay governments for military 
protection of these company assets to minimise operational disruptions. Despite 
deploying 2000 troops to the pipelines, 10% of Colombia‟s military, BP labelled their 
security strategy as a „hearts and minds‟ campaign (Knott 1993). Matters took a sinister 
turn, however, when a variety of allegations surfaced. These included collaborating with 
brutal military crackdowns, training private security firms in military tactics, and 
supporting right-wing paramilitaries who were harassing anyone along the pipeline they 
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considered to be sympathisers to leftists guerrillas, the National Liberation Army (ELN- 
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) (Heincke 2006, Muttitt & Marriott 2003, Taylor 2009). 
Meanwhile, the ELN grew from 40 members to over 3,000 (Ross 2003), a clear 
manifestation of the mounting conflict caused by BP‟s presence. The strategy of 
increasing security to provide security was clearly not working and BP found it 
increasingly difficult to expunge these allegations. 
 
 BP‟s troubles did not go unnoticed internationally. British development agencies 
condemned BP for operating in such a volatile political climate in 1999, saying that 
„however unwittingly‟, the company‟s actions had „seriously underestimated the 
implications that its investments in a region of violent conflict would have for the 
security of the poor in the region‟ (quoted in Muttitt and Marriott 2003).  Amnesty 
International was also concerned about the welfare of civilians under BP‟s highly 
militarised strategy, which dictated that „in order to have peace, we must train for war‟ 
(quoted from a BP internal security review in Gillard, Gomez and James 1998). Within 
Colombia, the clear link between company security operations and escalation of violence 
was also perceived, with an ombudsman stating that „the unequal investment (by oil 
companies) in security over community projects generates more conflict‟ (quoted in 
Gillard, Gomez and James 1998). The accusations levelled at BP culminated in legal 
battles in BP‟s home state of the UK, in which BP was anxious to settle to avoid 
admission of liability (Small 2009).   
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BP had embedded itself in the web of strongman politics, common in areas where the 
central government has no control and local players use violent tactics to assert political 
rights and as a problem-solving mechanism. Although initially slow to react, „BP got the 
message eventually‟ (quoted in Frynas 2009, p.23) and by 1996 its communications 
department resorted to damage control. David Rice, a former BP manager has been 
quoted as saying,  
         We‟ve learned from our mistakes, not least because we‟ve been challenged by 
NGOs. In Colombia we were accused of getting too close to the army and police in order 
to protect our operations. We listened, approached Human Rights Watch for advice, and 
then organized new security arrangements. (Frynas 2009, p.23) 
This form of exploitative learning was reactive, and was intended to minimise 
reputational and financial damage. It did, however, provide a possible basis for 
motivating exploratory learning endeavours for security solutions by BP in its subsequent 
Tangguh Project.  
 
Beyond errors in security arrangements, BP‟s wider social agenda was flawed. Although 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs were correctly targeted and well received, 
there were few strategies in place to control large influxes of migrants, nor was there 
enough support for local communities in finding employment with the company or 
elsewhere. These problems have created a vicious cycle of unemployment, poverty, 
disharmony and violence. BP‟s social policy has also been under fire from local farmers 
who complained of inadequate compensation and environmental degradation leading to 
the loss of livelihoods, which resulted in the 2009 court case (Taylor 2009). While some 
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parts of the social programs have enjoyed positive outcomes, especially those that are in 
partnerships with NGOs, aid agencies and governments, these gains have not resulted in 
an overall improvement in living conditions (Heincke 2006). It appears that CSR 
programs could not compensate for the harm created in BP‟s security arrangements and 
inadequate response to the shift of labour away from the traditional agricultural economy 
to an industrial one, and the resultant economic and social upheaval.  
 
In balancing its relations with the government, military and rebel groups, BP perpetuated 
the crisis of governance in the region. A government consultant noted that „the lack of 
State presence, primary levels of organization, lack of participation and action from local 
communities [negatively] influence [living conditions]. There are large needs to 
strengthen public performance‟ (quoted in Heincke 2006, p.81). BP was working within 
the anarchic political order and made little attempt to reform this situation until its hand 
was forced by reputational risks and violent conflict. The only means of increasing 
stability, controlling migration and labour, alleviating poverty, and thus minimising 
conflict would have been to take greater political control of the region, to act as local 
organiser, provider of public goods and facilitator of governance. This may appear to be a 
draconian strategy, as was most probably the opinion of BP at this point in its history, but 
taking increased control of an anarchical political situation appears to be more likely to 
yield the development results the community expects and the absence of conflict the 
company desires than perpetuating the local cycle of violence. 
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In the case of Colombia, the BP pipeline provided rebel groups with targets and the 
company‟s dubious conduct exacerbated existing tensions. Taking sides in the political 
landscape, allowing the military to dictate security arrangements, and inadequate 
programs to address problems of in-migration, unemployment and governance, were all 
fatal errors that BP needed to recover from in order to continue working in politically 
volatile regions without the significant costs incurred in Colombia. It was not the amount 
or type of resources that produced the resource curse, nor was it financial 
mismanagement on the part of the state. Nor was it rebels alone who created this 
situation, whose numbers had been dwindling prior to BP‟s arrival (Heincke, 2006). The 
catalyst for violence lay in the actions and inactions of the organisation and the impact of 
its decision making on a fragile community. The primary means of suppressing the 
symptoms of the resource curse in this situation is by the operating company securing the 
safety, opportunities and political future of the local community in order to decrease the 
chances of protracted violent conflict and to foster a constructive relationship between the 
company and the community.  
 
Former Exec B, who had been involved in the BP projects in both Colombia and Papua, 
said that in spite of the obvious cultural differences between the regions, there were many 
similarities between the socio- political environments and that some of the „core issues 
the company had to navigate‟ were identical. Both shared characteristics including an 
isolated location removed from the state capital, populations with high poverty levels and 
low life expectancy, the unpredictable presence of the military, and the likelihood of in-
migration to the region by job hunters wishing to work on the project. Monica Heincke in 
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her study of BP in Colombia, notes that „traditionally there has been an expectation in the 
country, reinforced by political expansionist discourses from the centre, that oil projects 
are to lead to “development”‟ (Heincke 2006, p.56) . This view can be transposed to a 
Papuan context also, with Former Exec B, SatuNama C, and BP Exec D all noting during 
interviews that managing community expectations of what Tangguh could bring was the 
Project‟s biggest challenge. The provision of resources is one thing, but converting them 
to meaningful development that will meet a community‟s long term aspirations is quite 
another.  
 
Former BP CEO, Lord John Browne, also saw the similarities between the political 
situations and potential problems in Papua and chose to station a collection of his best 
staff in Papua to ensure optimal outcomes (Former Exec B). With these similarities 
striking the executives and CEO of BP, it was clear that they could not repeat the actions 
of the past without risking the same result. Instead of taking a view of „we learn as we 
go‟, the experimental learning approach that BP had adopted in Colombia (Heincke 
2006), extensive studies and premeditated strategies were in order to promote deeper 
explorative learning. The upper echelons of the firm thus adopted a learning framework 
in place of its usual rigid dedication to straightforward profiteering. By using the results 
of the „experiments‟ in Colombia, drawing on the knowledge and studies of consultants, 
and participating institutionally in multi-stakeholder initiatives across the industry, NGOs 
and governments,  BP discovered new sources of learning to apply to Tangguh.  
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2.4 Freeport in Papua 
Freeport‟s history in Papua provides a contrast to Tangguh, in terms of Freeport‟s 
misconception of responsibilities and inhibited learning processes, while also providing a 
common regional context. At Freeport‟s copper and gold mines, there were few 
institutional limitations or restrictions placed upon the company, and indeed the Contract 
of Work was signed before West Papua‟s political status was settled and was Suharto‟s 
first multinational investor in 1967 (Leith 2003). The company was not required to 
consult the local community, let alone acknowledge their land rights, and there were no 
environmental restrictions to conform with. In Suharto‟s system of patrimonialism, where 
Freeport was a primary revenue source, there was little incentive for the company to 
attend to the local community.  
 
In terms of security arrangements, the military ingrained itself as the site‟s protector, with 
several reports indicating that the military even created crises to prove its own necessity 
(Perlez & Bonner 2005). Thus Freeport „signed a pact with the devil‟, as one former 
employee stated, the company supplying the military with infrastructure and making 
ambiguously accounted payments to public security forces (quoted in Perlez & Bonner 
2005). However, this would only bring battles between the military, police and 
oppositional groups to Freeport‟s door. Protests and clashes had occurred in the area 
since the 1970s, but when riots broke out in the concession area in 1996, troops were 
increased, making Freeport the most militarised zone in Indonesia (Leith 2003). As 
recently as 2010, violent skirmishes have regularly occurred in the area (Iltis 2010).  
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By the mid- 1990s, Freeport was under intense scrutiny and pressured by external forces 
to reform its social policies, while the slow demise of Suharto‟s regime removed 
Freeport‟s protectors. Its previous strategy of ignoring human rights issues was now 
obsolete. The company then acted to deny the past while simultaneously working to 
minimise future reputational damage. Opening the new Grasberg mine in 1991 provided 
Freeport with an opportunity to re-launch itself within the understandably hostile 
community. Freeport spent $153 million on social programs between 1992- 1999, but 
without consulting local communities, the projects were seen to be wasteful and 
paternalistic (Leith 2003).  
 
The pressure to adhere to international norms, the expertise of other organisations and the 
results of its past failures, which resulted in the endangerment of its staff and operations, 
provided tools for Freeport‟s learning. This is evidenced in Freeport‟s change in 
behaviours, in its policy changes and new commitments. Improvements have been seen in 
recent social programs, which are more broadly based and community directed, which 
can be partially attributed to partnership the company has formed with local and 
international NGOs (Leith 2003). Other changes Freeport made was to implement human 
rights training for staff, becoming a signatory to several international conventions and 
appointing a Special Counsel on human rights (Ballard 2001).  
 
It appears the company has a low absorptive capacity, that is, a limited ability to utilise 
external knowledge and incorporate this learning into practice (Lichtenthaler 2007), 
perhaps as a consequence of Freeport being „effectively a single-mine company… [that] 
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has not benefited fully in the past from the through-flow of ideas and experiences from 
mining operations in other countries‟ (Ballard 2001, p.31). Low absorptive capacity has 
meant that in spite of the company‟s newfound social commitments, protracted battles 
with the community and errors of judgment have created scars on the Papuan psyche. 
Continued links with the military also „hinders reconciliation between the company and 
community‟ and cannot be offset by social projects (Ballard 2001, p.28). The site is now 
symbolic of multinational complicity with Indonesian exploitation of Papua and its 
people, with no signs of conflict abating permanently, making the resource curse difficult 
to reverse.  
 
Freeport‟s mines have become synonymous with Papuan resource exploitation in the 
minds of Papuans and NGOs, meaning comparisons with new multinational resource 
extraction projects are unavoidable. There was a palpable fear that BP would cause the 
appearance of the resource curse in Papua once again (DTE 2005, JATAM 2004). 
Freeport‟s past errors and inability to learn by addressing issues pertaining to the 
community and shows the importance of a company‟s engagement with stakeholders. 
Receiving external knowledge held by other organisations and through evaluations of its 
conduct the company‟s capacity to learn is increased. It is through a willingness to learn 
that Tangguh may escape Freeport‟s fate. 
 
2.5 Learning and Tangguh 
The comparative cases show the limitations of resource curse literature. It is able to 
highlight the symptoms associated with the extraction of resources, however, it fails to 
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mention the role of the organisation‟s decision making in bringing about these outcomes, 
as well as the potential for organisational learning to reduce the severity of these 
symptoms. It will be seen that BP in its Tangguh Project has placed an increased 
emphasis on continued learning and research, making social knowledge of the local 
context as valued within the company as technical expertise and business acumen.  
 
The Tangguh Project began in a turbulent time in Indonesian and resource extraction 
history, providing a fertile environment for exploratory learning. With Suharto‟s 
departure leaving national and Papuan politics in disarray, the power of the military at its 
apogee, and the future of foreign investment uncertain, BP executives were nervous 
(Former Exec B). BP was paying the reputational costs of Colombia as it was exploring 
the Bintuni Bay area of Papua and conducting feasibility studies for the LNG plant in the 
late 1990s. Further calling into question the prudence of constructing a new resource 
extraction plan was the process of reformasi, as democratisation saw a resurgence in calls 
for Papuan independence, disturbing the stability made by the repressive climate of the 
previous authoritarian regime. Consultant A, who was involved creating social strategies 
for Tangguh said that approval for the project was on a „knife‟s edge‟ and that the BP 
Indonesia executives posed the tough questions before approving the project.  
 
It was not only company approval that was needed for the Project to go ahead. While 
many Papuan people have long been anxious for development (Kirksey 2009, King 2004) 
and expectations of its occurrence resulting from resource extraction projects is high, 
perhaps dangerously so, there is also mistrust of foreign extractors. The company has 
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taken issue with preconceived pessimism on the part of community leaders and NGOs in 
regards to its social policy (DTE 2009), but this drive to avoid comparison with 
extractors such as Freeport can be identified as a source for learning, as BP may strive to 
improve its social performance.   
 
In positing itself as politically neutral in terms of side-stepping strongman local politics, 
BP‟s Tangguh Project may prevent itself developing a duplicitous reputation.  
Furthermore, in viewing its political role as one of provider and facilitator, BP is aiming 
to legitimise its place in the Birds Head region of Papua. This legitimacy is needed in 
order to avoid being the target of Papuan separatists, whose threatening of Western 
economic interests as a political strategy may result in BP sharing the symbolic fate of 
Freeport (Singh 2008). To establish a reputation among all political actors- from the 
community, to NGOs and the government- as ethical, accountable and facilitating 
development would mean that BP could contribute to political stability, reduced levels of 
conflict and opposition, and thus produce a successful and profitable project. As to 
whether this goal is one that has been attained, or is attainable at all, this notion will be 
explored in the remainder of this study.  
  
 
 49 
 
Chapter 3: Evolution 
 
3.1 Evolution in the Resources Industry? 
Resource extraction projects are increasingly facing the possibility of unleashing the 
resource curse as scarce resources remain in geographically remote areas, in 
underdeveloped and politically volatile zones. This is especially so in post-Suharto 
Indonesia where there is no longer a stable authoritarian regime to protect 
unscrupulous extraction and the political and economic climate is unpredictable. 
Moreover, the stakes are higher than ever as corporate activities take place under the 
watchful eyes of the global financial markets and human rights movements.   
 
In spite of the power asymmetry inherent within relations between global resource 
companies and their third-world hosts, the power of multinational corporations is not 
unchecked. To have a cavalier attitude reminiscent of James „Jim Bob‟ Moffet, 
former CEO of Freeport McMoRan, who once described West Papua as Freeport‟s 
„slot machine‟ and the Grasberg mountain as a „decapitated volcano‟ whose 
„oesophagus‟ his company was mining (Leith 2003, p.9), could place major 
companies at great financial, legal and reputational risk; furthermore, ignoring human 
rights, security and the environment was no longer commonly acceptable. Institutions 
addressing these issues are now providing companies with the stability, guidance and 
discipline necessary in politically volatile zones. 
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Increasingly, the need to ensure a resource extraction project‟s success has given rise 
to the evolution of the corporation‟s political role through the institutions that guide 
them and the strategies employed. Rather than merely siding with a certain political 
actor in order to further business goals, as was seen in BP‟s Colombian operations 
and by Freeport in Papua, the corporation has become a political actor in its own 
right. Today, extractive firms are teaming up with aid organisations, professional 
security analysts and a battery of accountants and human rights lawyers to minimise 
uncertainties that accompany the increasingly risky ventures in underdeveloped 
nations. Buzz words within the resources industry are „transparency‟, 
„accountability‟, and „development‟, words borrowed from the vernacular of 
governance circles. Former Exec B exclaimed in the interview that these measures 
institutionalising corporate social responsibility, and facilitating governance and 
economic development, were a matter of „bloody common sense!‟ Yet questions arise 
in response to these changes within the industry‟s shift in espoused values. Is social 
responsibility within the extractive industry really „common sense‟? Is the extractive 
industry‟s transition from being unabashed corporate plunderers to politically correct 
ushers of development only a transformation on paper? Or have the institutions that 
produce this transition helped new projects avoid conflict in practical terms?  
 
To begin answering these questions, this chapter will examine the importance of 
institutions in affecting change and how institutions themselves evolve. A discussion 
will follow on how the resource industry‟s institutions have evolved by dissecting the 
structure, impact and changes made to the institutional framework affecting BP‟s 
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Tangguh Project. The chapter will discuss vital institutions encompassing a range of 
forms and sources - both formal and informal, exogenously and endogenously 
produced - concerning three primary areas of concern in the prevention of violent 
conflict: security arrangements, population change management, and the monitoring 
of adherence to these institutional guidelines.  
 
3.2 Tangguh’s Institutional Commitments 
BP‟s Tangguh Project has committed itself to an exhaustive list of formal 
international agreements in an effort to demonstrate its willingness to dedicate to the 
constraints imposed by these institutions. These include: Voluntary Principles on 
Human Rights and Security („Voluntary Principles‟ or VPs), Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
(Convention No. 169), World Bank Operational Directive regarding indigenous 
peoples, United Nations (UN) Norms of the Responsibilities  of Transnational 
Corporations with regard to human rights, and International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) environmental standards (TIAP 2009). The agreements range 
from providing guidance on human rights and indigenous peoples, to the environment 
and the place of a multinational corporation in volatile political zones. Their primary 
function is to inform stakeholders as to how the company plans to conduct itself and 
how it would like its project to be seen.  
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In order to bridge the divide between these espoused principles and the intricacies of 
the local context, more detailed institutional commitments were devised in 
accordance with Indonesian law and lender requirements. Institutional documentation 
was essential in binding the company to their professed principles and in order to 
minimise risk and uncertainties, so as to „constrain and refract politics‟ that may 
contribute to undesirable outcomes (Thelen & Steinmo 1992). A primary institutional 
commitment is the environmental impact analysis (Analisis Mengenai Dampak 
Lingkungan -AMDAL), required by Indonesian regulations. The AMDAL system has 
been described as „consistent with international standards but is unwieldy and often 
poorly or inappropriately implemented‟ (Ballard 2001, p.14). These standards include 
levels of waste and emissions, resettlement plans and local employment quotas.  
 
Additionally, Tangguh‟s primary lender, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
required BP produce the Integrated Social Program (ISP) and the Land Acquisition 
Resettlement Action Plan (LARAP) for villages affected by the Project. As the 
project‟s „licence to operate‟, the documents guided BP‟s sweeping range of social 
projects, from health to business development. Critically, the majority of these 
projects were to be undertaken in partnerships with local and international NGOs, 
including United Nations Development Program (UNDP), US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and Indonesian NGOs. The long term objectives 
of fostering effective governance and economic wellbeing independent of BP forms 
part of the company‟s „macro CSR‟ policy, in which it has taken „responsibility for 
 53 
 
the indirect consequences of relatively sudden, steep rises in revenue... on a country‟s 
economic, political and social development‟ (Gulbrandsen & Moe 2005, p.55).  
 
Assisting in achieving these standards, roughly seven years were spent in studying the 
region and planning the project which had previously been considered unusual in the 
resources industry. According to Former Exec B, Tangguh‟s social architects were 
given all the time they required, free from the „tyranny of the production schedule‟, 
which even contributed to the delayed opening of the plant. Community development 
planning is not usually associated with BP and, as Consultant A, who was involved in 
the baseline studies and in compiling the SEIA noted, BP was an oil and gas company 
with an „engineering culture‟. Even though BP was aware of what not to do, based on 
the instances of experiential and observational learning previously discussed, it was 
less aware of how to act upon their espoused principles. To this end, the input to these 
early studies by the social architects was pivotal in attempting to delineate BP‟s 
vision of fostering development while reducing the chance of conflict. 
 
3.3 Security 
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VP or VPSHR) can be used 
as a yardstick in this study for measuring the extractive industry‟s institutional 
evolution and its implementation by examining their implementation at Tangguh. VP 
is a multi-stakeholder initiative, created in 2000 by a group of extractive corporations, 
NGOs and governments (including the USA and most recently Colombia) all sharing 
„an interest in human rights and corporate social responsibility‟ to address safety, 
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security and human rights concerns within the extractive and energy sectors. BP and 
Freeport both took part in this dialogue that created the „only human rights guidelines 
designed specifically for oil, gas, and mining companies‟ (The Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights 2010). VP advocate risk assessment, interactions 
between companies and public security, interactions between companies and private 
security, and the development of systems of reporting and investigation into human 
rights abuse allegations. Salil Tripathi, who has been directly involved in plenary 
sessions of VP, has noted that the raison d’être of VP is the state failure to protect 
rights and the necessity of companies to fill this basic governmental responsibility, 
where „home governments are unwilling or unable to protect rights‟ (Tripathi 2010).  
 
This document is unique, firstly in its specificity to the extractive sector, and secondly 
in providing not only rules by which to abide, but constructive guidelines through 
which to create plans for the protection of human rights. These principles have clearly 
been formulated in response to the industry‟s troubled history in volatile states and 
aim to raise the standards and expectations of corporation conduct in such regions. 
Unlike most multi-stakeholder initiatives which are concerned with sanctions and 
punishments to control a participating member‟s behaviour on a certain issue, these 
principles are designed to be internalised into company conduct, communications and 
procedures, almost as a support group for self-regulation and a reminder of 
responsibilities. While nominally voluntary, the agreement is passed into state law, 
and is mandatory for employees of companies as the principles are incorporated into 
codes of conduct and company policies (Tripathi 2010). Thus, it is no coincidence 
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that VP are mentioned in BP‟s internal policies, including the Code of Conduct, and 
used in the creation, implementation and monitoring of social and security strategies 
(BP 2010, TIAP 2009, Ling & Smith 2005). 
 
Criticisms of VP have been mainly in regards to the administrative running and 
structure of the VP process (Freeman 2010), as well as its being overshadowed by 
more frequently cited resource industry initiatives that have been launched within the 
last decade, such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). These 
perspectives are valid in the sense that more could be done to improve the clarity, 
operationalisation and wider recognition of the VP. Yet this does not diminish their 
niche role of informing and guiding conduct for resource companies and it remains 
„the key global human rights standard for extractive companies operating in conflict 
zones‟ (Freeman 2010). In this regard, its application is acknowledged as critical. A 
more substantial criticism levelled at VP is that expecting companies to demand 
foreign security forces uphold human rights principles can be perceived as impinging 
on sovereignty. On the other hand, others have contended that this is necessary for all 
parties involved (Tripathi 2010); that companies have the responsibility to make 
states adhere to human rights principles and vice-versa. 
 
In being newly introduced, the successful implementation of the VP favours new 
projects over those already in play. Although Freeport is a signatory to VP, it only 
serves to show the difficulty of applying them mid-project. Freeport still relies on 
public security forces and is unlikely to be able to extricate itself from those 
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arrangements without considerable opposition from both the TNI and the 
government. On this point Tangguh has had a distinct advantage in being able to 
create processes and train private security services since the Project‟s inception, 
which has increased its ability to comply with VP. The Project created their 
Integrated Community Based Security (ICBS) strategy with VP in mind. Tangguh 
was four years away from construction when VP were released, allowing the 
maturation of VP and of BP‟s ICBS security policy before they were implemented. It 
also allowed for the internalisation of these principles, as intended, and this 
institutional framework thus became the operation standard within the organisation, 
showing the profound influence that this new institutional focus had upon a major 
company. Furthermore, Jakarta‟s promotion of the gradual demilitarisation of the 
police since its separation from the military, the removal of the TNI‟s responsibility 
to secure „all vital national assets‟, and de-politicisation of the military since the fall 
of Suharto also worked in favour of the ICBS (TIAP 2009). 
 
The ICBS was regarded as a „seminal initiative‟ for other extractive industries 
operating in Papua (Ling & Smith 2005). As a result of its own learning and in 
accordance with VP, BP was keen to maintain political neutrality and financial 
transparency in its security arrangements. Thus BP and the Indonesian oil and gas 
regulator, BPMIGAS, entered into an agreement with the police to demarcate duties, 
to emphasise the importance of upholding human rights and also outline budgeting 
and training procedures. Further, the Security Field Guidelines Agreement with the 
Papua Police (JUKLAP) was amended to extend the agreement in 2009. This 
 57 
 
agreement hinges on employing indigenous Papuans to provide the first line of 
security for the Tangguh Project. These Papuans have been hired by a Jakarta-based 
security firm, as no local provider could provide a sufficient tender when the scheme 
was created (GHD 2009). The National Police has been designated as the second line 
of protection, with a police outpost stationed in the nearby village of Saengga. The 
police would only be called upon in the event that a security threat could not be 
brought under control by local security, and the TNI would be called upon only if the 
police were also unable to bring a situation under control (BP 2004). TNI troops in 
the region number 130, with no significant increases noted, while police numbers 
have increased by 1, 500 recruits, a third of who are Papuans (TIAP 2008). Research 
has uncovered no evidence to show public security intervention has been necessary 
thus far in the Project‟s life. Also, there have not been any reports of human rights 
violations. This would tentatively suggest that the ICBS has been successful thus far 
and that heeding VP has proven valuable.  
 
The use of the ICBS and the JUKLAP has sought to defuse political tensions and 
criticisms regarding the Project, of which security was a central concern. Human 
rights violations were synonymous with foreign multinationals and security forces in 
the minds of locals and NGOs, based upon lived experiences. In this regard, it has 
been seen as controversial in the community and with NGOs to have any involvement 
with the feared police and TNI (DTE 2005, Kirskey 2009). The Tangguh Project has 
received little attention from human rights watchdogs, which may plausibly be 
indicative of the strategy being effective. SatuNama C commended BP on their „high 
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commitment‟ to implementing human rights principles, while BP Exec D stated 
unequivocally that „there has not been any violent conflict since BP arrived‟.  
 
Only one incident has been linked to Tangguh, which was the Brimob operation in 
the Wasior district of Papua from April to October 2001. This took place over 200km 
away from the Tangguh site and occurred three years before the operations‟ 
construction. Amnesty International reported that Brimob tortured, detained and 
executed over 140 people in the district after two attacks by an armed group on a 
logging company (Amnesty International 2002). Some commentators alleged that this 
conflict may have been intentionally staged by public security forces to encourage BP 
to use public security forces to protect its assets (Maitar 2005, Kirksey 2009). Those 
who reported that there was a connection had good reason to reach that conclusion, as 
instigating violence had been a TNI tactic to gain patronage that was effective in 
Freeport‟s concession site. Yet there is little evidence to prove this as neither the 
attacks, nor the human rights abuses took place near the site, and the perpetrators of 
the violence did not associate the incident with BP‟s security arrangements. If indeed 
it was a form of message or warning to BP, it was not a clear or effective one. BP did 
not acknowledge any link between the violence and its operations (Kirksey 2009), 
and the ICBS was still implemented instead of using public security forces.  
 
Although it appears unlikely that the incident was intended for BP‟s consideration, it 
does, however, reinforce the reality of the risks that BP faces in operating in Papua 
and the necessity of private security as a means of guarding assets. BP‟s very 
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presence has compounded the risks of conflict, being a prime target for sabotage and 
with the risk of military extorting the company and installing themselves as company 
security. The risk of military interference was evident in 2002, when the military 
commander paid the Tangguh Project an intimidating visit to inform BP of the 
military‟s obligation to protect national assets (King 2004). BP argues that it has 
chosen to engage rather than alienate in its adoption of the ICBS, while at the same 
time refusing the use of public forces as security. The ICBS has sought to change the 
role of security in the region, preventing it from extorting the company and terrorising 
the local community. 
 
3.4 Social Policy 
The Tangguh Project has not only been established in an underdeveloped and volatile 
political zone, but it has required village resettlement to accommodate the operations. 
Therefore social policies addressing land rights, resettlement compensation, 
employment and in-migration have been vital.  On land rights, BP‟s efforts at 
recognising such with the indigenous community have been a significant evolutionary 
institutional change for this multinational. Its social programs are based on the local 
indigenous people being the rightful owners of the land in complying with ADB, ILO 
and WB standards on the rights of indigenous peoples. This is in contrast to their 
production sharing partner, the Republic of Indonesia, which only recognised adat 
rights since the implementation of Special Autonomy and has never recognised the 
concepts of tribal indigeneity or traditional landownership. Indonesia is yet to be 
party to agreements such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
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seeing such acknowledgments as an affront to the principles of Pancasila, the 
doctrine of the Indonesian republic, and to the concept of „unity in diversity‟. 
 
 Additionally, under the Constitution, natural resources are to be exploited under state 
control in order to benefit the wider nation and adat rights given under Otsus are 
subsumed to national interest under the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960. This essentially 
allows the government to claim any land or resource as being in the national interest 
to exploit, regardless of its value to local communities. BP, while having to comply 
with national law, has gone further than the government in internationally recognising 
the hak ulayat (land rights) of indigenous tribes in the region and positively 
discriminating in their favour, including offering employment opportunities and 
development advantages to locals first.  
 
BP‟s acknowledgment of the importance of hak ulayat was evident in the location 
selection and resettlement agreements made with the local community. ARCO 
negotiated an agreement in 1999, but the community deemed it inadequate and an 
additional agreement with further compensatory measures was reached with BP. A 
consultative approach to negotiations has likely helped prevent the development of an 
adversarial relationship between the community and the company. BP‟s institutional 
and internal recognition of adat rights are significant in having gone beyond the 
government in attempting to promote development and restoring human rights.  
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In terms of relocation institutions, the LARAP was devised to provide „resettlement 
with development‟ for resettlement affected villages (RAV) (BP Berau 2006b, p.6). 
The Project‟s strategies in the LARAP have rendered mixed results, including the 
escalation of inter-village tensions, which arose alongside the decision making 
process regarding resettlement. Researchers vetted several sites for the possible 
location of Tangguh, when it was decided that the optimal location for the LNG plant 
required the relocation of the village of Tanah Merah (BP Bearu 2005). After much 
deliberation and consultation, BP reported that the community were generally 
supportive of the relocation, receptive to the idea of compensatory benefits (BP Berau 
2006b). Villagers from Tanah Merah chose where to relocate based on judgements of 
access to resources and social connections, moving to the nearby towns of Saengga 
and Onar in 2004. Input in site selection and resettlement planning has meant that 
some social tensions were reduced, while other issues of facilities- sharing and 
increased resource competition were identified as short term effects of relocation (BP 
Berau 2006b).  
 
The benefits accrued to RAVs have caused tensions on the part of villagers on the 
opposite northern shore. The north shore has lobbied to have the plant near their 
village, and claim that the gas reserves are beneath their traditional territory. This 
matter has become a significant source of tension that is still simmering in spite of 
compensatory efforts by BP and local governments (TIAP 2009). Benefits from ISP 
programs have been aimed at benefiting all villages within the Bintuni Bay area, but 
jealousies still run deep, proving to be a potential site for conflict that government 
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and BP largesse has so far managed to stall, but may flare up again if it appears that 
one village is being disadvantaged over another (TIAP 2009, SatuNama C, 
Consultant A & Former Exec B). Long term strategies are needed to be taken by both 
BP and local government, as is a thorough understanding of what the north shore 
villagers demand in the context of their adat claims and not in terms of short term pay 
offs of funding or infrastructure in exchange for silence.   
 
In terms of population growth, an important guideline that was developed by the early 
social architects of the Tangguh project that was the Diversified Growth Strategy 
(DGS). DGS was an important means of attempting to suppress symptoms of the 
resource curse and informed the direction of most social programs and strategies in 
the Tangguh Project. The strategy aims to ensure that the Bird‟s Head region derives 
benefits from the Project, mitigate in-migration in areas that do not have the capacity 
to cope, and to manage project-induced developments (BP Berau 2005). Instead it 
promotes a notion of „modular development‟ through the growth of nearby regional 
centres, which have a capacity for population growth and can assimilate larger 
numbers of migrants (Consultant A). It has been formally adopted by the Papuan 
government at the provincial and regency levels and is supported by the UNDP (BP 
Bearu 2005).  The guiding principle of the DGS is to encourage sustainable economic 
and population growth thus preventing the boom-bust economic effects and social 
tensions that this form of migration would likely cause. The DGS also emphasises the 
strengthening of local business capacity to harness growth in the regional areas, as 
well as facilitating political capacity and infrastructure across the Bird‟s Head Region 
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in order to accommodate the likely influx of revenues and migrants from the Project 
as well as increasing levels of development. 
 
On employment management, a comprehensive approach was needed in order to both 
benefit local RAV and Directly Affected Villages (DAV) populations, while 
preventing the negative effects of spontaneous migrant influxes. One strategy in 
keeping with the DGS to combat this potential point of conflict has been in workforce 
management. DAV and RAV members were given increased employment 
opportunities over of non-local workers in line with the minimum recruitment 
numbers stipulated by the AMDAL and LARAP. The operations phase has seen large 
parts of this workforce demobilised, but TIAP noted that levels of locals still involved 
with the LNG plant in 2009 exceeded recommended quotas in the AMDAL. 
Demobilised locals who were not offered a position with the company have been 
given skills training in specialised training centres in efforts to help them re-enter the 
workforce in another capacity (TIAP 2009). BP Exec D classified the issue as 
„manageable‟, although it appears likely that providing viable long term employment 
opportunities for the demobilised workforce will continue to be a challenge. 
 
Another aspect of the employment problem is that the arrival of large numbers of 
migrants in response to the announcement of new resource extraction projects is a 
phenomenon across Indonesia, Consultant A noted. As previously outlined, it was 
also a problem encountered in Colombia by BP that the company struggled to control. 
Commonly referred to as the „honey pot‟ effect, influxes of migrants seeking jobs can 
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negatively impact on the fragile social fabric and strain the resources of a small 
community. This is especially relevant in Papua, which has received influxes of 
transmigrants from across Indonesia, since it was a policy used in the Suharto years 
as a method of strengthening national identity (King 2004). The effect has been that 
nearly half of Papua‟s population is non-indigenous, with the majority of migrants 
living in urban areas, with many Papuans feeling displaced in their own land. In 
response to these issues, Tangguh recruitment and training for non-locals is 
conducted off-site in regional centres, with workers returned there once their 
contracts have finished. These workers are housed on the Tangguh site throughout 
their employment rather than being hosted in the neighbouring villages.  
 
In response to these strategies, there has been little in-migration to the north shore 
DAVs but RAVs have experienced high levels of growth from migration, with Onar‟s 
population increasing by 300%. Unfortunately, this seems to have also been 
accompanied by the increase of social issues including alcohol abuse and prostitution 
(TIAP 2009). An external review noted that „despite sustained efforts by BP and its 
contractors to keep in-migration to the minimum possible, it has occurred and cannot 
practically be undone‟ (TIAP 2009, p.54). However, another 2009 external report, 
submitted to the ADB, congratulates BP Tangguh‟s workforce recruitment team for 
limiting migration through its work, describing the influx as „comparatively small‟ 
and less than predicted in initial estimates (GHD 2009, p.9). One report focused on 
the results based on the changes within single villages, whereas the other takes a 
wider view of the issue, comparing it to what it may have been, had the strategies not 
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been in place. The disparity in results reiterates the importance of constant 
monitoring, where different views can be reached depending on perspective. It also 
shows that reaching standards and meeting criteria can mean one thing in a board 
room but another in an affected village, where adequate in one context may be a 
severe problem in the other.  
 
In the mixed results of these projects, regardless of their actions being in accordance 
with institutional guidelines, institutional frameworks are only effective to a certain 
extent, with some risks remaining present in spite of attempts to combat them. 
Looking at these institutional strategies, the factors contributing to the uneven results 
of the DGS and LARAP can be attributed to issues within organisational structures 
and in the implementation of these policies by these organisational units (BP Internal 
Audit Team 2007). The strategy shows preparedness for the risks and potential 
problems common to resource extraction projects in the region, and an admirable 
willingness to innovate and devise a method of confronting the problem. Yet further 
work has been needed to refine the institutional structures that are charged with 
implementing these pivotal new policies.  In the case of managing sources of 
potential conflict in inter-village tensions, Tangguh recruitment and in-migration, 
institutional frameworks have not been enough to prevent potential conflict factors 
from arising, especially when poorly or partially implemented. 
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3.5 Monitoring 
To ensure that institutions remain effective and adhered to, they need monitoring and 
reporting, as recommended in VP. In accordance with lender and AMDAL 
requirements, BP has commissioned a variety of internally and externally produced 
reports, which have been made publicly available. These include the seven annual 
Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel (TIAP) reports (2002- 09). This high volume of 
commissioned reports is characteristic of the „remarkable growth of corporate codes 
of conduct and social reporting‟ over the last decade that is publicly available (Frynas 
2009), the result of institutional requirements which are now standard procedure 
across the extractive industry. This monitoring is in stark contrast to projects previous 
to Tangguh, such as BP in Colombia and Freeport‟s Papuan mines, who had scant 
publicly available monitoring reports prior to the 2000s.  
 
A learning culture can be identified within the Tangguh Project staff in their 
responsiveness to monitoring. This feedback, including a mix of internal and external 
reporting, is essential in improving company performance, reviewing which programs 
have been successful and which may need to be modified, and demonstrates 
transparency and accountability. While the overall tone of these reports were positive 
in regards to Tangguh‟s operations and did not cite any incidences of major conflict, 
the reports strongly suggested improvements in areas such as the completion of 
infrastructure projects, the management of relations with north side residents and the 
increase of local workforce numbers. BP‟s responses reveal a receptive attitude to 
these criticisms and a commitment to addressing concerns and TIAP auditors noted 
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that BP had been responsive and provided practical action in areas nominated for 
improvement (TIAP 2009). Reporting clearly encourages the company to embark on 
both exploitative and explorative learning on the part of the extracting company in 
order to refine processes and find new solutions to problems before they arise, thus 
helping to reduce the chance of conflict erupting. 
 
In spite of the positive attitude taken by BP towards monitoring, there has been little 
research conducted that has not been directly commissioned by the Tangguh Project 
or its financial lenders in recent years, and it has received little media or NGO 
scrutiny since the early days of construction in 2004- 05. This may suggest that „no 
news is good news‟, as Former Exec B noted, meaning that the lack of reporting 
reflects a lack of incidences and problems emanating from the Project. However, one 
consultant voiced concern about this lack of continued independent monitoring, 
especially on the part of conservation organisations. It is also concerning that the 
NGOs who were once vocal in the initial stages of the Project, such as JATAM, 
ELSHAM and the Perdu Foundation, and were opposed to Tangguh on the grounds of 
BP‟s track record, possible damage to local livelihoods and security risks have not 
released studies following up on the Project‟s progress since the mid-2000s. NGOs 
and the media can play a significant role in holding BP accountable to its initial 
promises, challenge their public relations department, and can advocate for the 
community, especially those who feel marginalised. A lack of outsider scrutiny may 
give rise to the danger of BP losing its drive to improve its security and development 
efforts. The pressure that made resource extraction institutions change and force 
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organisations to comply and to innovate must not be removed. The concern in this 
scenario is that this traditionally neglected corner of Papua is likely to be neglected 
once more after enjoying a decade of attention thanks to BP‟s thrusting the region 
into the world economic system, dashing the hopes and aspirations of local 
communities. 
 
3.6 Institutions and Tangguh Policy 
The Tangguh Project was born in a period of institutional dynamism. With the fall of 
Suharto leading to a slackening of the military‟s grip on politics and business, and the 
beginning of an era of resource sector-specific human rights and CSR initiatives, the 
planning stages of the Tangguh Project were well timed. Beyond mere luck, multi-
stakeholder consultations and agreements, Indonesian environmental regulations, 
lender operational requirements, and BP‟s strategising have strengthened the 
institutional framework that is both constraining and supporting the Tangguh Project. 
This framework guides the company‟s approach to security and development and 
provides stability, while reviewing project progress. It thus provides rules and 
monitors enforcement in the absence of an effective central or provincial government 
sympathetic to its own people. 
 
 It can therefore be deduced that this shift within the institutional framework has 
greatly contributed to the Project‟s avoidance of conflict. Resource curse literature 
assumes the inevitability of violent conflict and economic disaster in a context such 
as Papua‟s, yet this institutional dedication to preventing violence, increasing 
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communication and transparency, appears to be effective in avoiding it. By 
highlighting the central role of the extracting company, the importance of the 
community receiving benefits, and the active approach to security, while monitoring 
activities‟ progress, institutions are questioning the continued inevitability of the 
resource curse.  
 
At the same time, institutional safeguards alone have not been capable of eliminating 
all conflict risks. Institutions can be blunt instruments, providing overarching values, 
guidelines and monitoring mechanisms, but cannot ensure the elimination of all 
project-specific uncertainties. The institutional change in the resource extraction 
sector within the last ten years may best be described as a paradigm shift, where 
individual puzzles may remain unsolved, but the terms of reference have changed, 
giving a new perspective in approaching problem solving. This paradigm shift has 
witnessed a previously unscrupulous extractive industry recognise social 
responsibility, a dedication to avoiding conflict, and upholding human rights as a 
corporate imperative – or simply „bloody common sense‟.  
 
 
  
  
 70 
 
Chapter 4: Metamorphosis 
 
4.1 BP’s Role in the Community  
BP, through a process of exploratory learning, has assumed primary responsibility for 
security, development and governance within Telek Bintuni and the wider region. 
BP‟s promises to the community have gone beyond usual „micro‟ CSR commitments, 
in which „activities are supplementing government policies in specific areas, but they 
do not interfere with government policy‟, for example the provision of basic 
infrastructure (Gulbrandsen & Moe 2005, p.55). While macro CSR responsibilities 
are associated with the role of a government, it is becoming more common for 
companies to take on such an approach. Indeed, „governance can reside in any 
institution and need not necessarily be activated by government‟ (O‟Hara 2007, p.30).  
 
This chapter will explore the notion of BP‟s institutional metamorphosis from 
business to pseudo-government, and the implications for regional stability in this 
stretch of institutional responsibilities. Through looking at the Project‟s adoption of 
the roles reminiscent of government in its approach to security, social and capacity 
building issues, it can be determined whether increased responsibility has given the 
company the ability to quash the resource curse. Tangguh‟s macro CSR approach will 
be analysed through the ICBS security plan, its commitment to local livelihood and 
development, and its capacity-building measures for fostering better governance in 
Papua. It aims to delineate what this new institutional flexibility means for the future 
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of the people affected, of governance in these regions and of the companies 
themselves.  
 
4.2 Governance and Gas Companies 
It may appear beyond the role of a corporation to provide a host community with 
basic living needs, however, in this case of gross governmental neglect, it may be 
advantageous to all stakeholders if the operating company takes on some of this 
responsibility. It is positive for communities in need if a third party delivers public 
goods, especially in Papua where corruption and discrimination is rife, which 
hampers the dissemination of goods and services. The weak local governments also 
lacks the necessary skills and resources to assess community needs, address them and 
monitor programs. Therefore, extraction companies can potentially be more efficient, 
transparent and technically capable of providing for citizens of a fragile state than 
their own government.  
 
In turn, effective social policies can help promote a company‟s relationship with the 
community, avoiding public controversy and production disruption through violent 
conflict, as „businesses that are perceived as exploitative or culturally undermining 
could sow the seeds for resentment and violence‟ (Fort 2007, p.19). By minimising 
the multiple harms it risks posing the environment, human rights and livelihood, 
while simultaneously maximising community benefits, the company‟s role has 
become one of „filling-in when government falls short‟ (Frynas 2009, p.4). 
Furthermore, some believe that comprehensive CSR not only has the potential to 
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prevent conflict and provide services, but it may even promote peace, as „ethical 
behaviour is an achievable goal with an unexpected payoff. It may be too much to 
think that one‟s daily work could achieve peace, but one‟s daily work can be ethical‟ 
(Fort 2007, p.6). It is possible that in contributing to economic development, avoiding 
corruption and embracing transparency, corporations can prevent violence and 
promote peace. 
 
The vision of responsible corporations appears utopian in comparison with the usual 
nefarious image of oil and gas companies, their sole motivation being profits. It is 
certain that although a company may mimic the government‟s roles it does not mean 
that it shares a government‟s goals, considering that the profit motive will most likely 
override any humanitarian impulse. Politically, the idea of a foreign extraction 
company being looked to for governance assistance initially appears absurd. Some 
declare that they „have neither the expertise nor the sensitivity needed to bring 
development to the most isolated and traditional peoples of the globe‟ (Leith 2003, 
p.250). This is reiterated by one oil and gas company manager in stating that „we 
cannot be government‟ (Frynas 2009, p.138), and even BP Exec D said that in spite of 
the company‟s role in the community being „significant‟, „we don‟t want to be seen as 
government‟. Moreover, the private sector is not immune to the dangers of poor 
policy implementation, and is also susceptible to corrupt activities. These initiatives 
also risk raising local expectations of dramatic increases in development, the 
possibility of dependency, accusations of paternalism, and the wastage of resources 
on unproductive, unnecessary and unwanted projects.  
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Yet some aspects of the government‟s role are expected to be filled by institutions 
and the community. Financial institutions, including the ADB, have made BP‟s 
dedication to restoring and elevating community livelihoods a condition of operation, 
with funding dependent on the fulfilment of development criteria. The local 
community at Bintuni Bay also expected BP to play a large role in fostering 
development (BP Exec D), as the provision of social necessities can act as 
compensation for damage to livelihoods, as rent for using land, and in order to benefit 
from the asymmetry of resources between the company and community. Previous 
negative experiences with logging companies in which little benefits were received 
for the extraction of their resources made the community suspicious of BP and 
anxious to see a tangible pay off (BP Exec D). It must also be acknowledged that in 
the case of an inept or predatory state, an increase in development and an assurance of 
safety will always be welcome, no matter what the primary motive may be. 
  
4. 3 Security 
The state does not always have a monopoly on force, as evident in the cases of BP in 
Colombia and Freeport in Papua. Rogue military brigades, mercenary private security 
firms, rebel groups and paramilitaries are all undermining what was once „the 
prerogative of the states‟ (Richani 2005, p.133).  In fact, in these conflict zones, the 
state has been unable to establish its legitimacy in its use of force as paramilitary 
forces escape the control of government. In Papua, while the state‟s military response 
has forced civilian and rebel submission, a nominally successful outcome for the 
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Indonesian government, it has come at the price of central government‟s struggle to 
tame a fiercely autonomous and political military (King 2004). In this anarchic 
situation, whereby multiple armed actors carve up the territory while the government 
has little will or ability to control even its own military, multinational companies 
working in volatile regions have the dual challenge of both protecting their assets and 
avoiding exacerbating tensions.  
 
As shown in the previous chapters, security policy has been a primary priority for 
Tangguh and has been guided institutionally by VP and its own ICBS. So far, it 
appears that all parties have been compliant with these agreements. The implication 
of this strategy is that a new security zone in Bintuni Bay has been established, where 
neither public security forces, nor militant groups can control Tangguh territory. In a 
sense, BP has sovereignty over the region, in discouraging external conflicts from 
entering the area in which the ICBS is operational. This strategy has doubtless 
minimised conflict and the Indonesian government has even speculated about having 
it applied to other resource extraction projects in Indonesia (TIAP 2008).   
 
Security risks persist within the Tangguh area of influence, however, in spite of the 
effectiveness of the ICBS. The strategy has limited ability to address internal conflicts 
that are not directly related to Tangguh‟s physical assets. Inter-village, inter-religious, 
inter-clan and anti-migrant tensions are the most likely sources of conflict resulting 
from Tangguh‟s presence and cannot be directly addressed by the security strategy. 
BP Exec D noted that the preferred method of intervention when community tensions 
 75 
 
arise is through „dialogue and consultation‟ and the inclusion of local government 
officials to help resolve these tensions. While this may be the ideal method of 
resolving internal conflicts, a contingency plan must be devised to address the 
possibility of internal violence erupting. A police post has been established at 
Saengga to deal with local safety issues, but it has caused more discomfort than an 
ease of these tensions (Maitar 2005, TIAP 2008). The effort to employ more native 
Papuans in all security forces involved in the region is a step in the right direction, but 
the issue remains that internal mechanisms must be established to diffuse internal 
disagreements without escalating conflict.  
 
In the case of security, it is unlikely that the community would be better served by 
another strategy, with BP‟s assuming of this governmental role a positive outcome for 
the community. Furthermore, it is their responsibility to provide this security as it was 
BP‟s presence that increased risks of conflict. While the ICBS has created a zone of 
security from forces external to the region, BP‟s concern must extend to fostering 
safety within the villages. Constant vigilance is needed on the company‟s part to 
prevent the encroachment of public security forces and to neutralise community 
tensions. 
 
4.4 Development 
Addressing security concerns directly have not been the only means of attempting to 
reduce the likelihood of conflict at Tangguh. A comprehensive social program aimed 
at sustainable development is designed to provide compensation, to raise the level of 
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development and to encourage economic independence in order to prevent bitterness 
between villages or directed towards the company, promoting stability through 
development. Many of the programs are aimed at the DAVs but will cease at the end 
of this year, incorporated into the wider program, as was always intended, under the 
assumption that these villages affected by relocation will no longer be at a 
disadvantage (BP Exec D, BP Berau 2006a, BP Berau 2006b). It is beyond the scope 
of this study to evaluate each aspect of the Tangguh social programs individually, but 
a couple of key projects will be analysed for their effects on future stability.   
 
An innovative and effective social program has been the Community Action Plan 
(CAP) where each DAV was allocated funds to devise and implement their own 
community development projects. This not only provides the villages with projects 
according to their priorities, but it teaches the committees how to manage funds, 
oversee project completion and also helps manage development expectations. 
Examples of CAP spending have included the construction of bridges, renovations of 
mosques and the purchase of fishing nets (BP Berau 2005). SatuNama C, whose 
NGO helped implement the program explained that the program focussed on teaching 
villagers „how to create and maintain their livelihood and how to release their 
dependent [sic] to natural resources‟. BP Exec D mentioned this program as being 
one of the Project‟s biggest social achievements and that the villagers‟ skills in 
planning, budgeting and reporting has noticeably helped DAVs compete for funds 
from local governments and the World Bank.  
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This social program was not initially popular with locals, who did not see the point of 
transparency and reporting of funds. BP Exec D noted that there was „always conflict‟ 
on this issue in the early years of the program, but as villages saw the results of not 
being accountable, through losing track of spending and poorly executed projects, 
they then called for increased transparency and „got used‟ to procedures. This 
program‟s eventual effectiveness lay in the fact that it had a tightly targeted local 
focus that was both beneficial and instructive for local communities, helping them 
gain what was needed, with minimal evidence of paternalism and discouraging 
dependence upon the company. It is this type of program which can discourage 
conflict in the longer term, as development expectations are managed because 
projects are favoured over „gifts‟, and each village has a sense of responsibility and 
ownership over their own projects.   
 
Education can be classed as a sustainable CSR program, as a long term project aimed 
at sustained development over generations. Education has always been a challenge in 
Papua, with major obstacles including: the distance of schools from villages, low 
quality of education, low belief in student abilities, clashes between the academic and 
agricultural calendars, chronic teacher shortages and a lack of educator support 
(UNDP 2005b). This may explain why BP‟s education programs have also met with 
limited success in the Bintuni Bay region, as many problems mentioned are endemic 
and are not easily overcome.  
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Cultural resistance may also explain the lack of traction the education program has 
received. TIAP reports pointed to a lack of education culture and institutions in the 
area (2009), but it is perhaps also a local reaction to the Indonesian curriculum, much 
of which would appear to be superfluous in a remote Papuan context. UNDP notes 
that education materials use „examples outside a student‟s frame of reference, which 
decreases learning effectiveness and motivation‟ (2005b, p.22). Some changes in 
education have occurred since Special Autonomy laws were passed, whereby adat 
and remote communities now have the right to „special- treatment education‟, 
although these programs still need to be in accordance with national education 
standards (BP Bearu 2006a). This amendment may help education gain more traction 
in the region, but cultural convergence towards Indonesian norms through the 
education system will still be inevitable and may yet be resisted by some 
communities.  
 
The concern with the weak results of primary and secondary education initiatives is 
that while a lack of education is not be a direct contributor to conflict, a lack of 
education can perpetuate the cycle of poverty. When unemployment remains high, 
tensions rise, as development is not seen within the communities. BP‟s challenge is to 
devise a scheme that is relevant to local surroundings and motivates local families to 
educate their children, while still providing them with tools to expand the local 
economy, in order to provide a new cycle of opportunities. This is not an easy public 
service for a company to help provide, as they have little influence over state 
education standards. 
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At the same time, increasing levels of education is an achievable task, especially 
given the positive community response to adult literacy and vocational skills training 
courses that have been offered. These have been widely embraced, perhaps as they 
teach skills that the adults perceive as more culturally and practically relevant (TIAP 
2009). This proves that education is not antithetical to local culture, but that it needs 
to be culturally relevant. It also demonstrates that the responsibility for providing up-
skilling and employment opportunities may actually be suited to corporations, which 
are in a good position to directly provide practical training and employment.  
 
4.5 Governance 
Given its political history, it is unsurprising to learn that governance mechanisms in 
West Papua province are weak and fractured. To describe them, it is necessary to 
understand the different – and multiplying – systems of leadership. Bintuni Bay is 
governed by leadership systems at the level of tribes, clans, and villages, as well as 
administration from districts, regencies, province and state. This is not including other 
respected forms of leadership, such as adat and religious authorities, which also exert 
authority in the community. This complex network of governance leads to 
„ambiguities of power‟ (Mayer 2010), whereby leadership is ill-defined, disputes are 
frequent, and resolutions are few. 
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Corruption is a primary issue within Papuan leadership. Among local elites, there is 
the pervasive idea that leadership „confers authority and privilege rather than 
responsibility‟ to the community (BP Berau 2006b, p.74). The elites that rise to power 
are not subject to rigorous standards of accountability, and take the opportunity to 
reap the benefits of their position. The provincial capital Manokwari holds the 
dubious honour of being Indonesia‟s third most corrupt city (TIAP 2009).  This 
statistic is made worse upon considering Indonesia‟s overall corruption perception 
index ranks a mediocre 111 out of a survey of 180 countries, bettered by Liberia and 
Niger (Transparency International 2010). Additionally, the province is dependent on 
Jakarta for funding and direction, BP thus finding governments to be „under-staffed, 
under-resourced and without capacity to deliver requisite inputs in the specified time 
frame‟ (BP Berau 2006b, p.142). Resources will continue to be sorely needed as the 
processes of administrative subdivision of districts, pemerakan, means that 
Kabupaten (regency) Telek Bintuni‟s 10 districts are further being divided into 24 
districts, increasing demand for better administrative capacities (GHD 2009).  
 
Dysfunctional leadership is also at odds with assumptions in resource curse literature 
whereby rebel groups have the capacity to challenge the government‟s position and 
claim to rule. The climate of military repression in response to Papuan uprisings has 
meant that the weakness of rebel chapters has prevented these groups from 
performing a pseudo-government role, as has happened in other civil conflict regions. 
In Colombia, some rebels and paramilitaries were known to provide not only 
protection but basic goods and services for civilians within their claimed territories 
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(Heincke 2006). In Papua, however, the military have the upper hand, preventing 
oppositional groups from surviving, let alone providing for the populace. The OPM is 
too weak, ill-equipped and nomadic to provide this governance and even the Papuan 
Council Presidium who emerged as a major diplomatic force for Papuan 
independence in 2000 „never did achieve...quasi-governmental status‟ (King 2004, 
p.111). In this climate of fear, no other group has been willing or able to overcome an 
omnipotent, but also neglectful, central government.  
 
The ideal situation is, as USAID E described, where governance is strengthened 
before major investments enter the region and not vice-versa. This helps address the 
power asymmetry between the community and the company, by using government 
regulations and negotiating strength. It also means the community will be better 
placed to manage revenues, as resource conflict theory supports. However, the 
likelihood of energy companies waiting for this to happen is slim, as the race for 
commodities continues. Thus, in the absence of governance, the role of interim 
government is one in which resource companies are cast by the demands and 
expectations of their stakeholders.   
 
Presumably comprehending that a governance role would automatically fall to them, 
BP looked to „governance‟ and „capacity building‟ measures in order to divest 
themselves of this responsibility in the future. Transferring this local political power 
to the community would reduce the chances of dependence upon the company. TIAP 
remarked on „the inevitable need to have government take charge of all social 
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programs, the clear benefit of this occurring at the earliest time and the large increase 
in local revenues that will take place all put a premium on effective governance‟ 
(2009, p.28).  
 
Controlling revenue flows is a critical element of governance and a critical means of 
avoiding the resource curse, and is a central challenge in Papua due to weak 
governance mechanisms and high levels of corruption. It is a priority of NGOs and 
international financial institutions, with a World Bank official stating that „CSR is 
missing the boat, the real issues are the fiscal issues... oil companies have a role to 
play in the improved management of revenues‟ (Frynas 2009, p.133). Thus BP has 
funded fiscal management programs in the region implemented by UNDP with the 
„Capacity 2015‟ program and USAID‟s Local Governance Strengthening Program 
(BP Berau 2006a). These programs have seen to be especially important as increased 
funds have flowed into the region since Special Autonomy laws. In light of the recent 
outrage in Papua that communities have not felt the benefit of these funds and that 
they have ended up in pockets of officials and wasted on rushed infrastructure 
projects (ICG 2010), the sustained implementation of these programs is paramount. 
 
 BP is also likely to encounter problems, if not adequately and pre-emptively 
addressed, in regards to the inflow of funds returning to the community from the 
Tangguh Project. BP based its development policy and its justification of the Project 
as being beneficial to the community on the assumption that Otsus funds would see a 
portion of revenues return to the province (BP Berau 2006b). While large sums have 
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been transferred from the central government to the Papuan provinces, available 
information indicates that the Indonesian Government‟s has hitherto failed to 
implement the resource revenue part of the policy package, and thus the community 
may not receive these benefits as profits are generated in the coming years (TIAP 
2009). There has not been evidence to suggest this has been a source of contention as 
yet, but as profits are due to be made within the next five years, this is a potential 
problem for the future. 
        Although BP Berau has indicated its support for Special Autonomy, it plays no 
role in the political decision-making... In the long run, the absence of a transparent 
and visible revenue stream to the province could create security risks for Project [sic]. 
(Ling & Smith 2005) 
While BP may not have the ability to enact these laws, especially considering its ties 
to the Indonesian government in the form of the production-sharing contract, an 
alternative mechanism should be considered in order to combat this likely source of 
tension.  
 
4.6 Is BP the Government? 
As the government intervenes when market failure occurs, intervention is also 
required when the resource curse appears. In the absence of a government taking on 
this role, it is left to the company to apply the corrective. BP has thus provided many 
essential public goods and services in Telek Bintuni, as well as managing the effects 
of its own presence. In providing an innovative security solution and attempting to 
reduce community dependence on the company it may also have helped prevent the 
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outbreak of violent conflict thus far. BP has successfully executed some governance 
functions, in areas that the private sector can provide support. 
 
Partnerships have been an essential component of the social programs, and BP funds 
have enabled the implementation of many long-term projects and have been valuable 
sources of continued learning. BP Exec D noted that „partnership with other local 
stakeholders such as local NGO... is important in tapping local knowledge and 
expertise, and at the same time building capacity of local institutions to ensure 
sustainability upon departure of the company.‟ This approach of using NGO and 
consultant input has become more common in the resource extraction sector with the 
effect that „the design and the implementation of company-funded projects have 
become more professional‟ (Frynas 2009, p.113). This more studied and pro-active 
approach, in which corporations learn from potential detractors, has caused a shift in 
the type of projects implemented. Infrastructure show-pieces, aimed at short term 
appeasement of local communities and public relations presentations, take a lesser 
role over longer term development programs aimed at sustainable economic 
development and incremental lifestyle changes. 
 
By the same token, the company is still an intruder in the community and its actions 
have transformed the region, as acknowledged by Former Exec B. BP has 
disembedded economies, in attempting to replace a traditional subsistence economy 
with a modern cash one. This has resulted in patchy employment for locals, raised 
hopes of increased wealth, and the re-training of entire communities in how to obtain 
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their livelihood. This subsistence lifestyle „does not mean the villages have no 
experience with or interest in the cash economy‟ (UNDP 2005a, p. 1), as the arrival of 
other resource extraction companies and transmigration camps nearby introduced 
wages, cash and trading in the 1980s. It formed a „colonial economic structure‟ 
whereby the indigenous community retain their subsistence lifestyle, while seeing 
settlers become wealthy by using local resources in the cash economy (Chauvel 2005, 
p. 51). BP has now made the cash economy the norm and something the community 
has little choice but to aspire to. This economic transition was perhaps inevitable, 
with BP providing valuable community support, but this road will be long and hard 
fought for the community, who have witnessed capitalism‟s „destructive creation‟ 
first hand.  
 
BP cannot explicitly be said to be the „government‟ of Bintuni Bay. Its actions are a 
fulfilment of its institutionalised and professed responsibilities, as well as in response 
to community expectations. Furthermore, its vision of its own involvement in the 
community is a temporary one, it was not elected to its position of power by members 
of the local community, and the company‟s only ideological position is a corporate 
ethos. The company has transformed the community, but it is not the sole source of 
leadership in the region and most programs have been developed and implemented 
with the assistance of other actors. However, the company‟s hybrid role and clear 
extension of traditional institutional limits supports the concept that „the world is 
moving towards systems of shared governance‟ (World Bank official quoted in 
Frynas 2009, p.55). In attempting to suppress symptoms of the resource curse, 
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particularly violent conflict, BP has established itself as an influential political actor 
in the region.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
It is now necessary to return to the research questions posed at the outset. Firstly, it 
was asked what factors contributed to the ostensible lack of violent conflict in the 
vicinity of Tangguh in spite of resource curse tenets predicting otherwise. Two 
primary factors can be distilled from the results of the study‟s institutionalist 
approach. Firstly, new institutional constraints have increased regional stability by 
dictating appropriate corporate behaviour, with a focus on extracting positive social 
outcomes for local communities. Secondly, BP has been seen to take on far more 
social responsibility than in its previous operations. It has proactively strategised to 
minimise effects associated with its presence, adopted a neutral security stance by 
refusing to use public security forces, and assumed governmental roles, while also 
encouraging the strengthening of local governance. 
 
The next research question asked if BP has undergone a process of learning and 
evolutionary change that has contributed to the absence of violence in its area of 
influence in Papua. BP has indeed learned from experiments, experiences, failures, 
and interaction with other actors to improve social performance, as evidenced in its 
application in the Tangguh Project. Exploratory learning was undertaken by BP in 
which it processed external sources of learning to create new approaches to security, 
governance and social programs. This direct attention to likely sources of conflict 
resulting from its presence was effective in avoiding resource curse symptoms in 
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these areas. The Tangguh Project shows the company‟s potential to apply this 
learning more widely and the value in doing so. 
 
BP‟s aims of exploiting oil and gas reserves remain the same, even though there has 
been an evolution in its manner of doing so. The company‟s responsibilities have 
been enlarged as a result of internal processes of learning and the external forces of 
institutional influence. An evolutionary process is visible in the changes in 
institutions that govern BP and the resource extraction sector at large. The last decade 
has seen the proliferation of multi- stakeholder initiatives cross-cut institutional 
boundaries, involving states, NGOs and corporations, seeing the evolution of 
institutions as they act as a regulator and stabiliser for the sector. This in turn has 
pushed resource extracting organisations to learn and innovate, allowing the 
companies to continue the race for commodities, while associating the growth of 
profits with the growth of responsibilities.  
 
5.2 Implications of the Study 
 The institutionalist framework is dynamic, focusing on the learning, evolution and 
metamorphosis of institutions. By foregrounding the role of extractive corporations 
and the range of sources of conflict that resource extraction produces, this framework 
can be applied to individual cases, as well as detecting wider sectoral developments. 
Furthermore, the results of the study imply that if corporations follow Tangguh‟s 
holistic model of security and development, the resource curse may become obsolete. 
If the institutional boundaries and commercial incentives dictate that corporations 
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take a larger role in volatile regions, they have the potential to avoid such problems as 
the collapse of other sectors, mismanagement of revenues and the onset of violent 
conflict. The resource curse is not inevitable so long as stakeholders collaborate to 
eradicate its occurrence, with primary responsibility lying with the extracting 
company.  
 
In spite of the institutional progress made by BP in Tangguh, the study has identified 
that challenges remain if the resource curse is to be avoided. Potential sources of 
conflict include inter-village jealousies, problems in resolving land rights and 
compensation issues, an increase in public security force numbers and the decrease or 
withdrawal of resources dedicated to social programs. Many of these are problems 
that have lingered since the company‟s arrival and must be clearly and definitively 
resolved.  
 
The biggest threat to instability, however, and the proximate cause of most other 
potential sources of resource conflict, is in the transformation of local lifestyles and 
economy. The globalised economy has already disadvantaged the local community of 
Bintuni Bay, a disadvantage that is as political as it is economic. BP has a great 
challenge if it genuinely wants to address the issue of livelihoods. To try and bring 
these communities into the global industrialised economic system without 
disadvantaging them further will be a slow and hard-fought struggle. Yet the costs of 
not doing so risks these peripheral communities remaining caught between two 
worlds, neither of which can completely fulfil its cultural, economic and political 
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needs. While the corporation alone may be an inadequate institution to facilitate this 
transition, shared governance between all actors has a higher chance of succeeding. 
 
5.3 Limitations 
 A more complete picture of the current situation at Tangguh, and Bintuni Bay more 
widely, would have greatly added to the study‟s accuracy and practical importance. 
This can only be achieved through a field study to Papua, which the author could not 
afford in time or money. An academic or NGO field study, one that is not 
commissioned by BP, is sorely needed to evaluate the impact of the Tangguh Project 
in the region. A field study would provide greater access to primary sources and the 
opportunity to speak with a greater number of stakeholders, such as villagers and 
community groups, which this study was regrettably lacking. It would transform this 
study from a theoretical reconsidering of resource politics, using Papua as a case 
study, to becoming an account of resource politics and socio-economic change in the 
region.  
 
Another limitation in the collection of data was the disappointing response from 
advocacy NGOs- both Indonesian and international- who did not respond to repeated 
interview requests, in spite of the fact that they had previously critiqued the Tangguh 
Project. Their input would have proven valuable in advocating community views and 
international norms. Academic analysis is stunted when the range of sources is 
limited and it is hoped that NGOs will return to monitor Tangguh, and other such 
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projects in volatile regions, in order to keep information current and hold corporations 
to account by publishing it for the international community. 
 
5.5 Future Research 
Three areas of further investigation can be identified in the course of this research, 
each pursuing further the key elements of the study. Firstly, as mentioned above, a 
field study is required to more accurately evaluate the effects of the Tangguh Project 
on the community. The project‟s strategies can only be acknowledged as effective 
after an evaluation of the Project and its longer-term commitments. 
 
The second avenue for further research is to confirm this thesis‟ hypothesis that the 
operating extraction company has the potential to suppress or control symptoms of 
the resource curse. This may be done in the form of a wide survey of extraction 
projects that involve volatile regions, fitting a certain criteria. VP may be used as a 
means of comparing those who adhere to those guidelines as opposed to those who 
have less institutional restrictions. Such a survey would provide confirmation of the 
merits of an institutional framework and show its wider application. 
 
Further research is also required to define the political role of resource extraction 
corporations since the institutional paradigm shift of the last decade. The study 
discussed that the redefinition of social goals by corporations and their institutions, 
and the expectations of local communities who do not have a strong governance 
structure, have resulted in the extracting company taking on a wider range of 
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responsibilities, including those typically associated with governments. It is necessary 
to now articulate what exactly this hybrid role is, and to delineate its boundaries and 
evaluate the effectiveness of its input in this area. 
  
5.6 Contributions of the Study 
To conclude, this study has contributed to resource conflict literature, widening its 
scope in terms of sources of conflict and the agency of the actors involved. An 
institutional approach emphasises the role of the corporation, and consequently the 
absence or presence of resource curse symptoms can be a result of the conscious 
actions of the operating extraction company. Through organisational learning, 
corporations have taken a new approach to social policies when operating in volatile 
political zones, which have been reinforced by a paradigm shift in the institutions that 
govern them. The institutional approach also shows how these forces have seen the 
corporation stretch its institutional boundaries to assume duties usually associated 
with the government, preventing the appearance of the symptoms of the resource 
curse.  
 
Finally, this study contributes to the academic oeuvre dedicated to studies on West 
Papua, a region whose indigenous peoples have long suffered on account of the 
wealth of its resources. This study shows that perhaps there is a chance that 
corporate- community relations will not always be adversarial and may actually be to 
the benefit of all involved. This study also serves to encourage vigilance on the part 
of the international community. All actors need to be monitored in volatile political 
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zones including corporations, security forces, and all levels of government. It is only 
through increased accountability, innovative solutions, and a dedication to human 
rights on the part of all actors that Papua will have a chance at sustainable 
development and political autonomy. 
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